Saturday, April 18, 2009

Fw: The Trend May Not Be Your Friend - John Mauldin's Weekly E-Letter

 

Sent: Saturday, April 18, 2009 1:49 AM
Subject: The Trend May Not Be Your Friend - John Mauldin's Weekly E-Letter

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Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter
The Trend May Not Be Your Friend
by John Mauldin
April 17, 2009
Visit John's MySpace Page

In this issue:
Thoughts on the Continuing Crisis
Dressing Like an Economist
The Trend Is Your Friend Until the End of the Trend
What Is Money?
MV=PQ
Newport Beach, Orlando, and Home

Two weeks ago I presented my thoughts on the current economic situation at my 6th Annual Strategic Investment Conference in La Jolla (co-hosted with Altegris Investments). The speech was well-received, at least to judge from the comment forms. So this week and next, we are going to revisit that talk (with a few edits). Let's start with a little set-up to explain the first few paragraphs.

My speech was Saturday morning. On Friday, I wore a nice grey suit with a Leonardo tie. For those who know about Leonardo's, they are "statement" ties. I should note that Tiffani picked the tie out for me about ten years ago and persuaded me to wear it. It took some getting used to. It is 16 silk-screened colors, bright blues and pinks and grays, the central feature of which is a very vivid parrot. It is not subdued.

When my good friend George Friedman of Stratfor gave his speech on Friday, he commented rather derisively about my taste in ties, which got him a few laughs. This did not bother me too much since, while George is a brilliant geopolitical analyst, his sense of sartorial style is not exactly top-drawer. So now, let's jump into the speech.

Dressing Like an Economist

Three years ago I was here at our third conference, and my daughter Tiffani came to me in the middle of the conference and said with a very serious face, "Dad, we've got to have a talk." Oops, we have to have a talk? This was her "You've done something wrong" face. But I didn't know what I had done. Had I been speaking with my zipper down? Was something I said wrong? So I said, "Well, let's go talk right now." And she says. "No, we can do this when you get home." And I said "No, now."

So we go to another room, and I ask, "What's wrong?" And she says, "Dad, the partners wanted me to come and talk with you." Oh God, I think, what is it?

Now, Art Laffer (he of the napkin and Laffer Curve fame) had spoken earlier at that conference. If any of you have ever seen Art speak, Art dresses to the nines. He gave a speech with which I did not agree. It was brilliantly delivered, but he was just wrong. But he looked really good being wrong.

So Tiffani says, "Dad, the partners want me to talk with you. You dress like an economist. You are supposed to be a guru. We've got to get you some new clothes." And it was true, I had not bought many new clothes for years.

So this is my guru suit. Somebody at least has some sartorial taste -- Tiffani and others picked it out. You can see the evidence of true style and taste by the way she dresses, can't you? And she picked out the tie, too. (And I should point out that the one person in George's family with outstanding taste, his wife and partner Meredith, liked the tie as well.)

Thoughts on the Continuing Crisis

Ok, with that out of the way, let's talk about some of my thoughts on the continuing crisis.

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This cartoon is pretty much where we are right now. The consumer is shell-shocked. That pot of gold has now become just a pot. The 401k's are now 201k's. People are trying to figure out how to go forward. Let's go back and get some sense on how we got here and what the landscape looks like and what I think the future will look like.

By the way, I started writing this speech at 1 o'clock yesterday because everyone else was saying what I was going to say, so my friend Kerri helped me create this PowerPoint yesterday. I'm making two classic mistakes that every speaker should never make, and they are: number one, if you are not a morning person, you should never speak first thing in the morning, but I had to trade places with Dennis Gartman; and number two, you should never make a speech to your most important audience that you haven't made somewhere already. So we'll see how it goes, but you guys are all my closest friends, okay? So cut me some slack.

In the beginning there were banks, and the banks were without form or regulation. That lack of regulation begat panics. You had the panic of 1807, then the 1827 panic and Andrew Jackson got rid of the Bank of the US. Then you had the panic of 1873 and the panic of 1907 And over time, the powers that be, not wanting to have any more panics, created first the Federal Reserve and then the FDIC. After World War II, there were basically no more worries about bank deposits. The FDIC covered them, and we entered a new era of "stability." This did not repeal the business cycle and prevent recessions, but it did stop major bank runs and banking panics. We can clearly have financial crises, but they will be different than those of the Depression.

The Trend Is Your Friend Until the End of the Trend

Stability, though, as we were taught by Hyman Minsky, leads to instability. The more stable things become and the longer things are stable, the more unstable they will be when the crisis hits, because we human beings learned to trade and invest by dodging lions and chasing antelopes on the African savannah. We now chase momentum and dodge bear markets. We are hard-wired to look around at our circumstances and predict trends far into the future.

We take the current trend and we project it forever. But the one thing we know about trends is that they are eventually going to end. The trend is only your friend until it ends. Trends are notoriously fickle. That stability breeds instability. Calvin Coolidge said in early 1929 that "In the domestic field, there is tranquility and contentment and the highest record of prosperity in years." The trend ended. "Apres moi, le deluge."

Now, so what happened in 1929, after this era of stability? The bubble burst and the stock market crashed.

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By the way, I thought one of the great headlines in the papers from those days was, "The deluge of panic selling overwhelms the market. 19 million shares changed hands." 19 million shares changing hands caused the crash in 1929! That's about a minute today. Okay, before the Great Depression, Coolidge was telling us, at the end of his presidency, that everything was cool, and then we got Hoovered. They tried to balance the budget, and they didn't really provide any stimulus. We got Smoot-Hawley. Given the massive implosion of capital and the closing of banks, there clearly was not enough growth in the money supply. Government and the Fed just did a lot of wrong things.

So at the height of the Depression, in 1933, as Roosevelt was coming into his first term, we had 25% total unemployment; 37% (!) of non-farm workers were unemployed; 4004 banks had failed; $3.6 billion in deposits was lost. That's like trillions in dog years, okay? At least in 2009 dog years. You end up with bread lines, and the stock market just keeps going down, down, down (with a few marvelous bear-market rallies – maybe like what we are seeing today?).

Roosevelt comes along and we get the New Deal. He applied massive stimulus. By the way, his stimulus hired people. He put them to work building parks and the Tennessee Valley Authority. They were building a lot of infrastructure. He didn't put it into Democratic wish lists and permanent wealth transfers and welfare and special-interest agendas to increase the overall budget beyond what we could ever hope to actually pay for (without even more radical tax increases), which the Obama Administration is clearly doing. We'll get to the effectiveness of current policies in a moment.

Then let's look at what he did in 1937. With the economy somewhat on the mend, he tried to balance the budget, raise taxes, reduce deficit spending. And what happened? We had another deep recession and unemployment jumped back up to 20%. It was hard to pull that stimulus back out. And it's particularly dangerous to raise taxes in a weak economy.

Most of the people in this room are old enough to remember the Blue Screen of Death. Remember, you would be typing along on your computer and all of a sudden you would get this screen, saying, "You have an impossible error." (Okay, what's an "impossible" error? Clearly something happened that was possible.)

And the only thing you could do was just unplug the thing. You couldn't even turn it off -- you just had to unplug the computer. It was the Blue Screen of Death. Well, that is kind of what World War II was for the world. We unplugged the world economy, and then we started from a new base. We hit the reset button. We were at lows everywhere in the world; places were in a mess. So we began to grow from there. The bebt supercycle started. For all the recessions and bear markets, a new stability ensued, and debt and leverage began to grow.

We'll revisit that point in a moment. We are doing just what I do in my regular e-letter: I'm going to take three or four ideas, and at the end I'm going to try and tie them all together. Let's see how successful I am.

What Is Money?

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Let's talk about what money is. For some people it's M-1 or M-2, and they worry that the money supply is growing too much. For some people it's gold; gold is the only real currency. I think those ideas each have their place, and there's some truths to them, but they focus us on the wrong thing.

It's a bit misleading to talk about money supply, because what money really is is roughly $2 trillion of cash and then $50 trillion in credit. Because what do the banks do? They take deposits in and then they borrow money to leverage them up. I take my credit card and I spend with it. I borrow against a house. I have an asset that rises, and I borrow against it.

We have two trillion dollars of actual cash propping up $50 trillion in credit. If we all decided to settle and pay off everything, we couldn't do it because there is not enough cash. There would be massive asset deflation. We, as a nation, are levered 25 to 1, or we were. Now, that $50 trillion is in a real sense the money supply because that is what we are all pretending is real money. I lend you money and you pretend you are going to pay me back. Then you pretend he [pointing at another attendee] is not going to call your debt for cash, and we are all going to keep the system going. Because if we all try to pay each other back at once, we are all collectively -- and this is a technical economic term -- screwed.

So we keep the system going. Now, where are we today? We are at the Great Deleveraging. We are seeing massive losses and destruction of assets, on a scale that is unprecedented. There was massive destruction of assets during the Great Depression, which caused a lot of problems, and we are seeing the same thing today. We are watching trillions simply being poofed (another technical economics term – which will drive my poor Chinese translator crazy!). We are watching people pay down their credit lines, which is one way of saying the supply of money and credit is shrinking.

This is not just in the US, but all over the world. Because when you start adding European cash-to-credit, and Japanese cash-to-credit, and Indonesian and Chinese cash-to-credit, it becomes multiple tens of trillions, and we are watching a goodly portion of that credit be vaporized. So we -- individuals and businesses -- are trying to find that $2 trillion in real cash and get some of it to pay down our debts. We are reducing that massive leveraged money supply down to some smaller number. We are hitting the Blue Screen of Death. We don't know what it is going to reset to, but we have permanently seared the psyche of the American consumer, and it is going to get reset to some lower number, about which I will speculate in a minute.

Now to give you some idea of how important credit was in our recent period of economic growth – and I keep using this slide, but it is an important slide because it shows you what would have happened in the economy without mortgage equity withdrawals. The red lines are what GDP would have been without MEWs. Notice that in 2001 and 2002 we would have had negative GDP for two years, that's 24 months. It would have been as long as or longer than the current recession. Not quite as deep, because we had the Bush stimulus and Bush tax cuts at the time. The Bush tax cuts were very important in keeping the economy rolling over in 2001 and 2002.

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But notice that the recovery for the next four years would have been under 1%. We would have had under 1% GDP for four years running, without mortgage equity withdrawals, without people being able to spend more. That doesn't even count the leverage we increased on our auto loans, on credit cards -- you saw the two charts that Louie [Gave] and Martin [Barnes] used yesterday about the growth of credit, and we are now seeing it in reverse. Do you think George Bush would have stood even a small chance of being reelected without mortgage equity withdrawals?

Quarter 1-2006 we had $223 billion in mortgage equity withdrawals. Quarter 2-2008 it was $9.5 billion. Is it any wonder we were in recession by 2008? By the third and fourth quarters there was no money to keep the treadmill going That $50 trillion in credit was shrinking fast. We were imploding it. Further -- just as a little throwaway slide -- if you look at 2010 and 2011, we are getting ready for another huge wave of mortgage resets.

Now, we've gone through the last wave and we saw what happened; it created a lot of foreclosures. We are not out of the woods yet. It is going to be 2012 before we sell enough houses to really get back to reasonable levels, because we had 3.5 million excess homes at the top. We absorb about a million a year, it takes 3 years, that's kind of the math.

[Skipping some attempts at humor that you had to be there to get] ... By the way, this AIG thing and the bonuses, that's so bogus. I mean, the 40 people that created the problem were gone, they go to 40 other people and say, stick around because we've got to have somebody who actually knows what these things are to try and unwind it, and we'll give you a bonus. Some of them worked for a dollar against getting that bonus, and now we've told the world that a contract isn't a contract in the US of A, for a lousy 160 million dollars. No bank is going to want to play with the US again, because you don't want to be hauled up in front of Barney Frank.

MV=PQ

Okay, when you become a central banker, you are taken into a back room and they do a DNA change on you. You are henceforth and forever physically incapable of allowing deflation on your watch. It becomes the first and foremost thought on your mind: "Deflation, we can't have it." So let's move along to the next point, and then I'm going to tie them all together.

MV=PQ. This is an important equation; this is right up there with E=MC2. M (money or the supply of money) times V (velocity, which is how fast the money goes through the system -- if you have seven kids it goes faster than if you have one) is equal to P (the price of money in terms of inflation or deflation) times Q (which roughly stands for the quantity of production, or GDP)

So what happens is, if we increase the supply of money and velocity stays the same, if GDP does not grow, it means we'll have inflation, because this equation must balance. But if you reduce velocity (which is happening today), and if you don't increase the supply of money, you are going to see deflation. Now, we are watching, for reasons we'll get into in a minute, the velocity of money slow. People are getting nervous, they are not borrowing as much, either because they can't or because the "animal spirits" that Keynes talked about are not quite there.

To fight that deflation (which we saw in this week's Producer and Consumer Price Indexes) the Fed is going to print money. A few thoughts. The Fed has announced they intend to print $300 billion. That is different from buying mortgages and securitized credit card debt -- that money (credit) already exists.

When they just print the money and buy Treasuries, like the $300 billion announced, they can sop that up pretty easily if they find themselves facing inflation down the road. But that problem is a long way off.

But sports fans, $300 billion is just a down payment on the "quantitative easing" they will eventually need to do. They can't announce what they are really going to do or the market would throw up. But we are going to get quarterly or semi-annual announcements, saying, we are going to do another $300 billion, another $500 billion.

When we first started out with TALF and everything, it was a couple hundred billion here and there, and now we throw the word trillions around and it just drips off of our tongues and we don't even think about it. A trillion is a lot. It's a big number. And the total guarantees and back-ups and all this stuff we are into -- I saw an estimate of $10-12 trillion. That's a lot of money.

Understand, the Fed is going to keep pumping money until we get inflation. You can count on it. I don't know what that number is, I'm guessing $2 trillion. I've seen some studies. Ray Dalio of Bridgewater thinks it's about $1.5 trillion. It's some big number, some number way beyond $300 billion, and they are going to keep at it until we get inflation.

Side point: what happens if the $300 billion they put in the system comes back to the Fed's books because banks don't put it into the LIBOR market because they are worried about credit risks? If that happens, it does absolutely nothing for the money supply. Okay? It's like, goes here, goes back there -- it doesn't help us. If the Fed creates money which is simply deposited back with the Fed, then there is effectively no money creation. We are still faced with deflation. The Fed has got to somehow get it into the financial system. They've got to figure out how to create some movement.

Will it create an asset bubble in stocks again? I don't know, it could. Dennis [Gartman] talked about being nervous yesterday. I would be nervous about stock markets, both on the long side, as I think we are in a bear market rally, but also there is real risk in being short. Bill Fleckenstein will be here tonight. He is a very famous short trader. He closed a short fund a couple of months ago. He says he doesn't have as many good opportunities, and basically he's scared of being short with so much stimulus coming in. So it's going to work, at least in terms of reflation, but the question is when. A year? Two years?

(This is about as good a break point as I can find in the speech, so we will end here and take it up again next week.)

One note from today's data on deflation. The headline in the Wall Street Journal says China grew at 6.1% last quarter. That doesn't sound bad. But what was not in the story is that nominal growth was just 3.7%. The other 2.4% was because of deflation. To get real (after-inflation) growth you subtract inflation and/or add deflation. Growth in China is slowing down more than the headlines suggest.

Newport Beach, Orlando, and Home

I am writing this somewhere over Canada as I fly back from London. I always try and stay up on the way back so I can get on local time quickly, although I did not get enough sleep this trip. I will need to catch up this weekend. It will be good to be home.

This Thursday Tiffani and I leave for Newport Beach to attend Rob Arnott's annual conference. Each spring Research Affiliates brings together a rather special group of analysts and money managers to work through current economic issues. Harry Markowitz, Burton Malkiel, Mohammed El-Erian, Paul McCulley, and Peter Bernstein are just a few of the luminaries who will be there. I think Rob invites me for comic relief. And just like Jeremiah, he always serves some mighty fine wine (a few of you will get that).

Sunday I get back and then leave Monday to go Orlando to speak at the national Chartered Financial Analysts conference. My assigned topic will be the "state of the union" for alternative investments. If you are attending, you might want to drop into the session, as it will be at the very least provocative and for a few people rather controversial. I think the whole industry is at a crossroads, and we are going to see some real changes in the coming years.

And then? I am home for awhile. I told my London partner Niels Jensen that I would show up for his 50th birthday party in mid-July, and maybe try to take a vacation then. And Amanda gets married in Tulsa in August. And of course the annual Maine fishing trip in early August. Oh, and Freedom Fest is penciled in for July 11, in Vegas. But not much travel in May and June, at least not yet.

Copenhagen and London were a whirlwind this week. I ended up getting asked to do CNBC Europe for about 30 minutes on a wide range of topics. I really like their Squawkbox crew. And it was good to spend time with the team at Absolute Return Partners. We had some very thought-provoking client meetings.

There is a lot of change getting ready to happen in my business, and I am grateful that it all seems to be for the good. I will be making a few announcements over the next few months that I am quite excited about. There are a lot of people in the finance world (and the world in general) that are really struggling, and I appreciate the support of my clients, my partners, and you, gentle reader. You are why I write this letter. Well, maybe you and my one million other closest friends -- but we both know it is really for you.

It's time to hit the send button, get my bags, drive home, get a good meal, and find my own bed. Have a great week!

Your happy to be home analyst,

John Mauldin
John@FrontLineThoughts.com

Copyright 2009 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

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Monday, April 13, 2009

Fw: Thoughts on the Market Rebound - John Mauldin's Outside the Box E-Letter

 

Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 6:52 PM
Subject: Thoughts on the Market Rebound - John Mauldin's Outside the Box E-Letter

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Volume 5 - Issue 25
April 13, 2009



Thoughts on the Market Rebound
by Tom Au and William Hester, CFA

This week we will look at two shorter essays for this edition of Outside the Box. The first is some thoughtful words by Tom Au on whether or not we have put in a true bottom for the market. I particularly want you to read his thoughts on what earnings will look like going forward, and whether we can get back to the highs in corporate earnings we saw in 2006.

Tom is the executive vice-president of R. W. Wentworth, a contributor to Real Money at www.thestreet.com and the author of "A Modern Approach to Graham and Dodd Investing"

In last Friday's letter I mentioned an article by William Hester, CFA, who is the Senior Financial Analyst at the Hussman Funds. (www.hussmanfunds.com) While I quoted a few paragraphs from his essay, on reflection I think I will re-produce it below, as this is a very important concept. I have written in past letters and in Bull's Eye Investing about how powerful a driver earnings surprises can be (both positive and negative). Powerful bear and bull markets develop when there are numerous surprises in the same direction, re-enforcing market psychology.

So, read Hester's essay with the knowledge of what Au writes about earnings. I think the two make a very powerful, thought-provoking concept. And I am off to Europe.

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box

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EmergInvest


Watch Out For the Second Leg of the Downturn
by Tom Au

Do you think that the crash is over, as certain former bears do? This question arises as we have breached the first downside target, of Dow 7000, based on my proprietary investment value model, that was first published in thestreet.com October 24, 2007. It was less a forecast than an evaluation. The Dow has now vindicated this model by reaching "fair value," as one would expect from a simple definition. Does that represent a base for a new bull market? Or is it just one more stop to the nether regions?

To understand my model, note that a stock can be analyzed as a combination of a bond plus a call option. My proprietary investment value metric for a stock is book value plus ten times dividends. That is a Ben Graham like construct that treats stocks almost like bonds, and gives no effect to growth over and above the pro rata return from the reinvestment of retained earnings. On the other hand, many investors prize stocks, particularly tech stocks, for their "optionality," the hypothetical ability to generate "positive surprises" over and above what economic theory would support. At bottom, the belief in the new economy was a belief in "optionality," that random positive events that occur from time to time, and did so with particular frequency in the 1990s, will become a recurring fixture of the economic landscape.

But such a process can also work in reverse, as it has recently. We are now experiencing what my colleague Robert Marcin calls the Great Unwind. A turbocharged economy is most likely to become "unstuck" when the conditions that initially favored it no longer exist. When this happens, an economy can grow as much below trend as it was formerly above trend, a fact that is likely to be reflected in the financial markets. History is not very encouraging on this score. In past downturns, such as those of 1932 and 1974, the Dow troughed at one half of my investment value metric, reflecting then-prevailing investor beliefs for negative optionality; that the economy will be worse than normal economic forces would dictate. With investment value at 7000 (actually a rounded version of 6600) on the Dow, half of that would be 3300. And during the 1930s, this metric actually fell, meaning that the "ultimate" low could be half of a number lower than 6600.

So having completed a first downleg, the market is now working on a second one. And this would be fully reflective of economic forces. For instance, financial earnings used to represent some 40% earnings (if you count the financing arms of some old line "industrial" companies such as General Electric and General Motors). Thus, they made up $32 of what used to be normalized S& P earnings of $80. But most of those financial earnings have disappeared. That, by itself, would take the S&P earnings into the $50s.. But how many of those non-financial earnings (of $48) were tied to the finance bubbles such as the homebuilding and the "housing ATM?" At least 10%, or around $5, and that is being conservative. Thus, normalized S&P earnings are likely to be no more $50 a share, if that.

The problem comes at payback time. For instance, much of the borrowing was tied to the housing market, on the bogus theory that houses could be made twice as valuable (as a multiple of rent) as they were for all of American history if prices could be kept on steady incline. The problem was that valuations collapsed when house prices fell, or even failed to rise, bringing down the market with it. To make up the shortfall, the U.S. economy now has to consume less than it produces, for a time. But the formerly virtuous circle became a vicious circle when falling prices (and consumption) led to falling production in a self-reinforcing process of the kind best described by George Soros in the Alchemy of Finance. This is a process called underabsorption, which in its strongest form, is called disintermediation. When a major part of the economy becomes "unstuck, the rest of it doesn't merely go into retrograde. It has to fall apart also to keep pace.

But I can live with $50 trough earnings, say many. And at historical multiple of 14-16 times trough earnings, the S&P should stop its downside in the 700-800 range. But the point is, they're not trough earnings, they are the "new normal." And in the current "slow" (zero or worse) growth environment, a trough P/E of 6-8 times earnings is more likely. Put another way, we are about to get the worst of all worlds; below trend earnings, below trend growth from a depressed base, and below trend P/E, after having gotten the best of all worlds, astronomical P/Es on above-trend and rapidly growing earnings, about a decade ago. Warren Buffett now agrees, saying that we will get "almost the worst of all possible worlds..."

The bears-turned-bulls have taken the latter stance because the market now reflects at least a severe recession. One such commentator likened the recent market to 1938-1939, and feels that the latter represents a bottom. But the 1930s bottom was 1932, not 1939, which is to say that the market probably has further to fall. Having correctly dodged the "overvaluation" bullet earlier, the new bulls pin their hopes on the prospect that the current market represents everything bad short of the 1930s Depression. Unlike us, they aren't willing to grasp the nettle that the current crisis will likely be as bad as anything including the Great Depression.


A Stock Market Rebound Closely Linked with Economic Data Surprises

by William Hester, CFA - April, 2009

There are several ways to interpret the economic data in March, most of which came in above what economists were expecting. Some analysts concluded that the worst is over for the economy, and a rebound is ahead. Others suggested that the economy is still contracting, but at a slower rate for now. In any case, economists have overestimated the economy's rate of contraction lately. The rebound in the stock market has been at least partially fueled by economic data that consistently came in better than expected last month. Some part of this rally is likely relying on the continuation of these "positive" surprises.

To track the trends in economic performance, we keep an ongoing tally of how data is announced relative to expectations – a method of analysis originally inspired by Bridgewater Advisors . Economic data that surpasses expectations gets added to a 3-month running total. Data that comes in weaker than expected gets subtracted. A rising line means that economic data is generally coming in above expectations, while a falling line means that the data has disappointed. A descending line could be the result of an economy that is not expanding as quickly as economists predict or – like in 2008 – it could be the result of an economy that is contracting at a faster rate than expected. In the first graph, and the others below, I've isolated only the data that measures the growth in the economy, leaving out measures that track the rate of inflation and sentiment. The first chart below shows the surprise line for growth-related economic data since last August, just prior to the passing of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, from which the first version of the TARP was born.

jmotb041309image001

There's nothing quite like pointing out how bad a shape the economy is in to get people acting like the economy is in bad shape. During the early part of last summer the economy was actually holding up better then what was generally expected. But during the final quarter of last year, the economic surprise line (in blue) collapsed. Data persistently came in below expectations, which created the steepest drop in the line tracking economic performance versus expectations in the available data.

The red line in the graph above tracks the S&P 500 Index and it shows that stocks have recently closely tracked the trend in data surprises. The market fell along with the deteriorating surprise line last year, rallied slightly prior to improved news in December, and then rolled over again as the news weakened versus expectations in late January. In March the market rebounded along with a more pronounced persistence in favorable economic news versus expectations.

The data released in March was better (or less negative) than expected on a number of fronts. The slowdown in spending eased, there was temporary relief in the new and existing homes sales data, and sentiment measures mostly halted their steep decent of recent months. But while much of the data was surprising relative to expectations, it's difficult to point to any piece of data that was surprisingly strong (outside of some of the volatile data series like, for example, durable goods). New homes sold at an annual rate of 337 thousand versus 300 thousand (and a peak of 1.4 million). GDP was revised to -6.3 percent versus an estimate of -6.6 percent.

Much of the excitement in the stock market – at least that is related to the current performance of the economy - seems to be centered on an economy that is performing less badly than expected. The risks here seem to be that if the trends in data surprises change, so could investor's attitudes toward stocks that are currently overbought on a number of measures.

There are a couple of reasons why the trend in the rate of data surprises could change. The first is that trends in economic surprises are very prone to reversals. The chart below shows a longer-term picture of the changes in the trends in economic data surprises. The one thing that stands out looking at the graph is that the trends in surprises often reverse abruptly. When the estimates of economists fall behind in an expanding economy - underestimating its strength - expectations are adjusted upward. These estimates eventually become too optimistic. The same can be said of an economy that is contracting more quickly than expected. And the data shows that the more pronounced their forecast errors – the more abruptly economists begin to overestimate the economy's recent trend.

jmotb041309image002

Another reason why the economic news may begin to disappoint at some point is that recoveries rarely proceed smoothly. The trends in month-to-month and quarter-to-quarter data tend to lurch forward and backward as the economy regains its footing (and at times, like in 1982, the economy can fall right back into recession).

One recent example of this was in 2002, which is shown in the graph below. The trends in economic data versus expectations were persistently better than expected from late 2001 as the economy emerged from recession that year through late spring of 2002. The S&P 500 surged by more than 20% from its 2001 low as the economy began to regain its footing and offer up positive data surprises. But by the summer of 2002 the rebound proved not robust enough when compared with economist's expectations, and the surprise line rolled over. With stocks not yet at valuation levels that were attractive to investors, the S&P plunged along with the data surprise line.

jmotb041309image003

It's important to note that this was during a period where the economy was, in hindsight, no longer in recession, and where there were many measures that showed the economy was growing again. But the market was still tripped up at least partly because expectations had moved ahead of the economic recovery. The bear market remained unfinished, and stocks fell to new lows. This may turn out to be an important risk over the next couple of months. The economic data is certain to be uneven, which in turn may cause investors to begin to question whether an economic recovery is really at hand. Risks will likely be higher at points where the market is overbought.

Investors tend to punish economic disappointments much more strongly during bear markets than during bull markets. The graph below, which shows the S&P 500 and the surprise line from 1998 to 2002, highlights this tendency.

jmotb041309image004

Although it's just a portion of one cycle – the late stages of an expansion and a mild recession, it's worth noting how stocks performed in response to economic data surprises. In the last part of the 1990's bull market, a rising economic data surprise line mostly fueled rallies. Data worse than expected weighed on performance – often causing shallow declines like in 1998 and late 1999. Conversely, during the 2000-2002 bear market, disappointing economic data coincided with steep declines in equity prices, while positive surprises usually eased the market's deterioration.

These trends were also evident during the market's advance from 2003 through 2007, but were somewhat less dependable. During that period, the trends in the surprise data were shorter and more variable than the market's slow, persistent advance. Since last summer, the correlation between the two has tightened considerably. In fact, the correlation between the S&P 500 and the data surprise line has climbed above .80, implying that investors are keeping a close eye on how data comes in relative to expectations.

If the high correlation between stock prices and data surprises holds, the recent rally in stocks might be tested. Even if the economy has bottomed, it's very likely that the eventual recovery will prove to be uneven, causing the flow of positive surprises to be uneven. During these periods, the risks to stocks will be greatest when the market is overbought and investors have priced in high expectations of positive data surprises continuing.



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John F. Mauldin
johnmauldin@investorsinsight.com
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