Fw: The Statistical Recovery - John Mauldin's Weekly E-Letter

 

From: John Mauldin

Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 4:18 AM

To: jmiller2000@verizon.net

Subject: The Statistical Recovery - John Mauldin's Weekly E-Letter

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Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter The Statistical Recovery by John Mauldin July 24, 2009
In this issue: The Return of Muddle Through* Can China Lead the Global Recovery? The Statistical Recovery The Last Bear Standing New York, Maine and Tulsa
A lot of bullish commentators are talking about a recovery being in the works, and they may very well be right. But it is not going to look like any recovery worthy of the name. This week we look at what I will call The Statistical Recovery. But first we take a look at what China is doing, as we continue our look at the rest of the world and ponder whether it is time to brace ourselves for an extended bout with the Muddle Through Economy*. (And yes, there is an asterisk.) Quickly, and importantly, tonight we are releasing the first in a new series of quarterly Conversations entitled Geopolitical Conversations with John Mauldin and George Friedman. We believe that these new Conversations will help you better understand not only the global political landscape but also how it affects the financial umbrella that we are under. In this first Conversation, we talk about the "exogenous" risks to the markets (those from outside the markets themselves) posed by the geopolitical world. George and I are going to make it a regular quarterly gig. We will offer this service, which will be priced separately, at some point in the near future. Now, here is the important part: all current subscribers and anyone who subscribes now will receive these Geopolitical Conversations free, as a thank you. (Current members can log in now.) If you have not yet subscribed, you can do so and receive a discount, by clicking the link and typing in the code JM49 to subscribe for $149. This is a large discount from our regular price of $199; plus, we are including the bonus Geopolitical Conversations that are worth $59. Further, we will post a separate interview next week that I have obtained permission to use from my friends at Casey Research, and which I personally found very valuable. When we launched Conversations, we promised eight interviews a year. We are now at six, and next week I will record the seventh with housing experts John Burns of John Burns Real Estate Consulting and Rick Sharga of Realty Trac, the two leading experts on housing in the country. There is SO much uninformed, simplistic misinformation in the media about housing that I thought subscribers might like to know what the real situation is. When you subscribe, all of the past Conversations are there for you to review. I am going to make sure subscribers get way more than their money's worth. You don't want to wait another day to subscribe. And now, let's jump into this week's letter. Can China Lead the Global Recovery? China is growing by about 8% a year, which is amazing on the surface of it, as their exports are down about 20% (more in some sectors). How can that be? I continually read about how China is going to lead the world out of its global funk. And 8% growth in GDP does seem pretty strong. But we need to look a little deeper. If I told you that the next US stimulus package would be $4.5 trillion dollars, mostly given to banks that would be forced to loan out the money quickly, do you think that might jump spending and GDP in the short term? Would you start looking for a few bubbles to be created? What about the dollar? That is the equivalent of what China is now doing. The volume of credit that is flowing into China is equivalent to one-third of their GDP. Banks that already have large problem-loan portfolios are now lending even more, in a very short time frame. China has severe capacity-utilization problems, as trade has sharply fallen; and the US consumer is unlikely to return to anywhere near the level of consumption that was the case in 2006. The Chinese stock market is up 85% this year, and commodity and real estate prices are rising. And no wonder: the money supply shot up 28.5% in June alone. That money is looking for a home. My friend Vitaliy Katsenelson has written a very perceptive essay for Foreign Policy magazine, talking about the nature of the current growth in China. "But don't confuse fast growth with sustainable growth. Much of China's growth over the past decade has come from lending to the United States. The country suffers from real overcapacity. And now growth comes from borrowing -- and hundreds of billion-dollar decisions made on the fly don't inspire a lot of confidence. For example, a nearly completed, 13-story building in Shanghai collapsed in June due to the poor quality of its construction. "This growth will result in a huge pile of bad debt -- as forced lending is bad lending. The list of negative consequences is very long, but the bottom line is simple: There is no miracle in the Chinese miracle growth, and China will pay a price. The only question is when and how much." I am going to quote at some length from Simon Hunt's latest note. He travels very frequently to China and is one of the world's true experts on the copper market. If you want to know something about copper, ask Simon. Copper, we are told, is the metal with a PhD in economics. If copper prices are rising, then the economy is booming. And historically, that has more or less been the case. But there may be reason to believe that PhD may be no more useful this time around than a regular Ivy League degree. "The world community has come to see that China is its savior. Growth picked up sharply in the second quarter, but it is based on fixed asset investment and renewed speculative activity in the real estate sector. It is not what the actual GDP or IP [Industrial Production] numbers will show that matters, but the quality of that growth. Money is cheap with loans and credit freely available, so much so that China risks developing new bubbles in the stock and commodity markets and real estate. Speculation is based on the simple premise that prices must rise. Foreigners as well as domestic participants are feeding this frenzy, especially in metal markets. "The frenzied loan and credit growth is unlikely to be cut back until the fourth quarter at the earliest. It is not this year or next which worries us, but post 2010. What will China do when the world economy gets hit with its next big leg down? "There is no better example of this speculative activity than what is being seen in the copper market. It is easy for global merchants, hedge funds etc to ship cathode into China and warehouse it outside the reporting system, so fuelling investors' sentiments that copper demand in China is soaring and at the same time draining copper from the rest of the market. "It is not so much industry which is doing this buying in China, but individuals, financial institutions and even small companies divorced from the copper industry who are buying and holding the metal because copper is a store of value and prices will go up is the common response. We updated our numbers for the first half of this year. They are truly staggering. Over 1 million tonnes of cathode is sitting in China mostly outside the reporting system as a punt on rising prices." (Emphasis mine) If it is happening in copper it is likely to be happening in other commodity markets as well. If you are trading the metals, you should be aware that a quick drop could happen if demand falls off due to there being a glut of supply coming back onto the market. Why would China engage in what seems from our shores to be very risky behavior? Because from their point of view it makes sense. It is not a lot different in concept than what the US or England is doing to stimulate their economies. The scope and size are different, but China also has a much different problem. They are attempting to soften the transition from an economy dependent on the US consumer to one that is more balanced. Will they be successful? The answer depends on what they are actually trying to do. You could (and should) also ask whether Bernanke will be successful when he decides to remove reserves from the economy. Avoiding financial Armageddon may be the measure of success in both countries, with the reality that there will be some pain, no matter what. Who Ends Up with the Old Maid? But the important news out of China this week was the assertion that China was getting ready to use its massive $2.2 trillion reserves. From the Financial Times: "Beijing will use its foreign exchange reserves, the largest in the world, to support and accelerate overseas expansion and acquisitions by Chinese companies, Wen Jiabao, the country's premier, said in comments published on Tuesday. 'We should hasten the implementation of our "going out" strategy and combine the utilization of foreign exchange reserves with the "going out" of our enterprises,' he told Chinese diplomats late on Monday. Mr. Wen said Beijing also wanted Chinese companies to increase its share of global exports. The 'going out' strategy is a slogan for encouraging investment and acquisitions abroad, particularly by big state-owned industrial groups such as PetroChina, Chinalco, China Telecom and Bank of China." This is a very big deal, and from the Chinese point of view, quite smart. Right now they are stuck with $2 trillion in US Treasuries, agency paper, etc. They can't sell their dollars without really hurting the dollar, thereby forcing the renminbi to rise and hurting their own exports. But they, and much of the world, feel that the US is pursuing policies that are going to be harmful to the value of the dollar and therefore to China's largest reserve exposure. What to do? Take those dollars and buy physical assets. Companies, natural resources, maybe a few small countries. (To my Chinese readers: that's a joke, although some in the West worry about that.) In the card game called Old Maid we played as kids, the loser was the one who ended up with the "Old Maid" at the end of the game. For the past decade, the Chinese sent us "stuff" and we sent them dollars in the form of electrons. They in turn invested those dollars in our debt so we could buy more stuff. It was a form of vendor financing. And now the Chinese have apparently decided to pass the Old Maid of the dollar on to other parties, who will sell them their assets for dollars. Seriously, did anyone not think they would do this? Massively selling the dollar, which so many conspiracy-theory types keep saying they will, was never really a rational option. But using those dollars to acquire productive assets? Very smart, very rational. If you figure out what they want to buy and get there first, there are profits to be had. Attention should be paid. $2.2 trillion in reserves and growing can cover a lot of economic sins and bad bank loans. It can buy time for the companies with too much production capacity in China to find new customers. Will it be a smooth ride? Of course not. There will be a lot of bankrupt companies and a lot of angst among the entrepreneurial class. That is part of the process. But in five or ten years, China will be larger and stronger than it is today. Count on it. That being said, is it likely China will pull the world out of its current slump? Not for a while. China is just 7% of global GDP. Even if they grow at 8%, that only adds 0.5% to global growth, and it is likely that we will see global GDP shrink by 2.7% in 2009. Look at the chart below from my friends at Hayman Advisors. A few side observations on the above graph. China is roughly as big as the other three of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, and India) combined. Russia and Brazil are in recessions. Also, note that it will be decades before China's economy is as big as that of the US, even with growth of 5-6% a year more than that of the US. Will it eventually be as big? Of course, and it should be; tt has four times more people. Will it matter? Not a bit. Does Denmark care that the US or Germany is bigger? Not that I can tell. Does Dallas care if New York is bigger? You just deal with the reality in front of you and try and make the most of what you have. If you focus on the other person or country, you lose sight of your own goals. Further, I rather doubt that China will be growing by 8% a year in 15 or 20 years. Like all large economies, they will start to experience slower growth. And they will have their own demographic problems in a few decades as a result of the "one child" policy. Every country has to deal with its own specific issues. That being said, will there be opportunities in China and other emerging-market countries? You bet. I rather think that the developing world will be where the real opportunities will be as the world figures out what the New Normal will look like. And now, let's look at a few issues the US will have to deal with. A Statistical Recovery "I've been down so long it looks like up to me," went the song of my youth. The recessions is not quite two years old. Every day we are hit with increasing unemployment, lower incomes, rising taxes, and more - a relentless stream of bad news. We wonder whether it will ever end. And the answer is that of course it will. And it may be ending now. But this is going to feel like a very different recovery from what we normally think of as recovery. It will be more of a statistical recovery than a real one. The easiest way to explain that concept is to look at the following graph. At one point, housing construction was over 5% of GDP. Now it is around 2.5%. The graph shows how much a shrinking home-construction industry has reduced GDP each quarter for the last two years. Without going into a lot of detail, housing construction may be at a bottom, or at least there is less room to fall. Instead of housing subtracting 1% (or more) from GDP each quarter, it may become a nonfactor as a bottom is reached. Does that mean recovery? No, it just means that things aren't getting worse. We are finding that level of the New Normal. Ditto for inventories. At some point, you have to restock the shelves. Rail shipments are down by almost 20% from last year, and UPS package volume is down 4.7%. And as Dave Rosenberg pointed out this morning, that is from last year's already depressed levels. As Alan Blinder noted today in the Wall Street Journal, at some point you finally get to bottom. Housing, inventories and business investment stop subtracting from GDP, and the GDP stops shrinking. And as I pointed out a few weeks ago, the fact that we are buying less from outside of the US (imports) may show economic weakness, but from a statistical point of view that is positive for GDP. All of this means that we could see – actually, we will see – a positive GDP number at some point. Those of bullish persuasion will talk of recovery. But for the 10%-plus people who will not have a job next year, it is not going to seem like a recovery. Nor for the additional 7% (at least) part-time employees looking for full-time work. Go back to 2001. We had "the end of the recession." Bulls were out in force, trying to talk up the market. But unemployment still rose for almost a year. And the stock market noticed. The market did not really take off for well over a year, and actually continued to slide into 2002. The Last Bear Standing Notice in the chart below that unemployment continued to rise until the first quarter of 2003. And that is also when the stock market took off. Those who see green shoots need to think about that. Meanwhile, the market is clearly telling us that it sees nothing but blue skies in the future. I truly marvel at this rally, but I continue to think it is a bear-market rally. The weakest, high-beta names are rallying the most. This rally does not seem to be the basis for a sustained bull market. That being said, Richard Russell has removed the bear from his letter and put in a bull. I may be the last bear standing. The media tells us earnings are coming in above expectations. But expectations have been lowered so much that the target is much easier to hit. Even then, the "upside profit surprises" are coming from cost cutting, which is not sustainable as a profit center, at least not if you are trying to grow the business. And laying off employees, while perhaps good for the profits of one company, is not good for the overall economic business environment. The Muddle Through Economy* This is going to be a long, jobless recovery. Hours worked per week are at an all-time low. As noted above, part-time work is very high. Employers, when things actually start to turn around, and they will, will first give current employees more hours and then expand the hours of part-time workers. There will be few new jobs for a long time. Because our population is growing, between 130-150,000 new jobs are required each month to keep unemployment from rising. Initial and continuing claims suggest we are currently losing at least 300,000 a month. (As an aside, the media talks about initial unemployment claims falling. That is actually not true. Unemployment claims are in fact quite high and rising, but the seasonal adjustments make them look smaller. Normally, this would not be a big deal. But the summer seasonal adjustment assumes a normal automobile manufacturing market, with layoffs in July. The layoffs came much earlier this year, distorting seasonal adjustments.) Higher and persistent unemployment, lower incomes and wages, higher savings rates, capacity utilization at 50-year lows and still falling, rising home foreclosures, a deleveraging financial system, etc. are not the stuff of "V-shaped" recoveries. Throw in that Moody's estimates that US banks will have to write off $400 billion in 2010, and it's a very weak recovery indeed that shapes up for next year. It's the return of The Muddle Through Economy*, which is better than what we have had, to be sure. But that asterisk is there for a reason. Congress and the Obama administration are seemingly hell bent on a massive tax increase. If that happens, it will push a fragile recovery back into recession. It will look like the twin recessions of 1980-82. It will be a difficult investing environment, to say the least. If buy-and-hold is not your favorite style, there are alternatives. Quick commercial: my friends at CMG have a platform of alternative managers that can be tailored to your specific needs. These are traders who have weathered the storms of this last decade. These are individually managed accounts, with daily liquidity. You really owe it to yourself to see the managers on their platform. The link to their form is http://www.cmgfunds.net/public/mauldin_questionnaire.asp. I am encouraged by the fact that the radical health reforms look like they might not pass. The health-care system clearly needs a major overhaul. Let's hope that we get it right. In a future letter, I am going to talk about taxes. I am concerned that we are going to raise taxes now to very high levels, and not leave any room for the tax increases we are going to desperately need in the middle of the next decade to pay for entitlement programs. That will mean a VAT tax and tax increases on the middle class. Again, not good for the economy. But enough for today. Time to hit the send button. New York, Maine, and Tulsa Next week I am going to take a few days off and head for a beach somewhere, along with my summer reading list. I will get back for one day, and then with my 15-year-old son head for New York for an evening dinner with Art Cashin, Ron Insana, and George and Meredith Friedman. That should make for interesting conversation. Then off the next morning to Maine, after shooting a few spots with Aaron Task and Henry Blodgett at Yahoo! Tech Ticker. CNBC and Steve Liesman will be at the Shadow Fed fishing event, and it looks like I will do a few minutes with him, as they plan to do an hour-long special with many of the investment writers, economists, and analysts who will be there. I am really looking forward to that trip. And then back home for a few weeks before going to Tulsa for Amanda's wedding on the 22nd. Amanda was a competitive cheerleader for a long time, and she is bringing that drive to the wedding. If there is deflation in this country, it is not in wedding costs. Two weddings in two years has me breathing hard. And two more to go, although right now it looks like that might not be soon. And if the job market will help out, Amanda and Allen (her fiancée) and her twin sister Abbi intend to move back to the Dallas area after the first of the year, which will mean I'll have all seven kids close to me again. I really look forward to that. We tend to get together as a family for brunch at least every other Sunday, and it's a fun day for me. Lots of love and laughing -- and now babies. And more on the way! There is a bull market in my joy in my kids, that's for sure. And now it really is time to hit the send button, as I am off to the local pub to have a drink with #2 daughter Melissa. She is going to have to have her gall bladder removed, and Dad likes to check in now and then. Have a great week, and enjoy your summer before it goes away, Your doing better than Muddle Through analyst, John Mauldin John@FrontLineThoughts.com Copyright 2009 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved Note: The generic Accredited Investor E-letters are not an offering for any investment. It represents only the opinions of John Mauldin and Millennium Wave Investments. It is intended solely for accredited investors who have registered with Millennium Wave Investments and Altegris Investments at www.accreditedinvestor.ws or directly related websites and have been so registered for no less than 30 days. The Accredited Investor E-Letter is provided on a confidential basis, and subscribers to the Accredited Investor E-Letter are not to send this letter to anyone other than their professional investment counselors. Investors should discuss any investment with their personal investment counsel. John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA), which is an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. John Mauldin is a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS) an FINRA registered broker-dealer. MWS is also a Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB). Millennium Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. Millennium Wave Investments cooperates in the consulting on and marketing of private investment offerings with other independent firms such as Altegris Investments; Absolute Return Partners, LLP; and Plexus Asset Management. Funds recommended by Mauldin may pay a portion of their fees to these independent firms, who will share 1/3 of those fees with MWS and thus with Mauldin. Any views expressed herein are provided for information purposes only and should not be construed in any way as an offer, an endorsement, or inducement to invest with any CTA, fund, or program mentioned here or elsewhere. Before seeking any advisor's services or making an investment in a fund, investors must read an examine thoroughly the respective disclosure document or offering memorandum. Since these firms and Mauldin receive fees from the funds they recommend/market, they only recommend/market products with which they have been able to negotiate fee arrangements.
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You have permission to publish this article electronically or in print as long as the following is included: John Mauldin, Best-Selling author and recognized financial expert, is also editor of the free Thoughts From the Frontline that goes to over 1 million readers each week. For more information on John or his FREE weekly economic letter go to: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/learnmore To subscribe to John Mauldin's E-Letter please click here: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/subscribe.asp To change your email address please click here: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/change.asp If you would ALSO like changes applied to the Accredited Investor E- Letter, please include your old and new email address along with a note requesting the change for both e-letters and send your request to wave@frontlinethoughts.com To unsubscribe please refer to the bottom of the email. PAST RESULTS ARE NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THERE IS RISK OF LOSS AS WELL AS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR GAIN WHEN INVESTING IN MANAGED FUNDS. WHEN CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, INCLUDING HEDGE FUNDS, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER VARIOUS RISKS INCLUDING THE FACT THAT SOME PRODUCTS: OFTEN ENGAGE IN LEVERAGING AND OTHER SPECULATIVE INVESTMENT PRACTICES THAT MAY INCREASE THE RISK OF INVESTMENT LOSS, CAN BE ILLIQUID, ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE PERIODIC PRICING OR VALUATION INFORMATION TO INVESTORS, MAY INVOLVE COMPLEX TAX STRUCTURES AND DELAYS IN DISTRIBUTING IMPORTANT TAX INFORMATION, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE SAME REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AS MUTUAL FUNDS, OFTEN CHARGE HIGH FEES, AND IN MANY CASES THE UNDERLYING INVESTMENTS ARE NOT TRANSPARENT AND ARE KNOWN ONLY TO THE INVESTMENT MANAGER. John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA) which is an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. John Mauldin is a registered representative of Millennium Wave Securities, LLC, (MWS) an NASD registered broker-dealer. MWS is also a Commodity Pool Operator (CPO) and a Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) registered with the CFTC, as well as an Introducing Broker (IB). Millennium Wave Investments is a dba of MWA LLC and MWS LLC. All material presented herein is believed to be reliable but we cannot attest to its accuracy. Investment recommendations may change and readers are urged to check with their investment counselors before making any investment decisions. Opinions expressed in these reports may change without prior notice. John Mauldin and/or the staffs at Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC may or may not have investments in any funds cited above. John Mauldin can be reached at 800-829-7273. EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/unsubscribe.asp Or send an email To: wave@frontlinethoughts.com This email was sent to jmiller2000@verizon.net Thoughts from the Frontline 3204 Beverly Drive Dallas, Texas 75205

Fw: Should the Fed be Responsibly Irresponsible? - John Mauldin's Outside the Box E-Letter

 

From: John Mauldin and InvestorsInsight

Sent: Monday, July 20, 2009 7:03 PM

To: jmiller2000@verizon.net

Subject: Should the Fed be Responsibly Irresponsible? - John Mauldin's Outside the Box E-Letter

	Contact John Mauldin Print Version Volume 5 - Issue 38 July 20, 2009 Should the Fed be Responsibly Irresponsible? By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and Paul McCulley This week I offer two short essays for your reading pleasure in Outside the Box. The first is from Ambrose Evans-Pritchard writing in the London Telegraph. He gives some more specifics about the situation in Europe I wrote about this weekend. He ends with the following sober quote: "My awful fear is that we will do exactly the opposite, incubating yet another crisis this autumn, to which we will respond with yet further spending. This is the road to ruin." This is a must read. And the second piece? Last week in Outside the Box we looked at an "Austrian" (economic) view of the inflation/deflation debate from my friends at Hoisington. This week we look at the 180 degree opposite with Keynesian aficionado Paul McCulley, who argues that the Fed should be Responsibly Irresponsible and target higher inflation. This essay has brought some rather heated arguments in print and from some of the people who will be with Paul and me at the annual Maine fishing trip. And you can bet I will put them all together with a little wine to see how the argument ensues. I will report back. And Paul ends with a great and what is a quite controversial line, "Yes, as Bernanke intoned, there are no free lunches. But no lunch doesn't work for me. Or the American people. While it is true, as Keynes intoned, that we are all dead in the long run, I see no reason to die young from orthodoxy-imposed anorexia." And finally, this one last note on European banks: "European banks including Societe Generale SA and BNP Paribas SA hold almost $200 billion in guarantees sold by New York-based AIG allowing the lenders to reduce the capital required for loss reserves." (Bloomberg). Want to think about the US taxpayer paying to bail out Europeans banks? Think that might be a tad controversial? This could be explosive. John Mauldin, Editor Outside the Box ADVERTISEMENT Fiscal ruin of the Western world beckons By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard For a glimpse of what awaits Britain, Europe, and America as budget deficits spiral to war-time levels, look at what is happening to the Irish welfare state. Events have already forced Premier Brian Cowen to carry out the harshest assault yet seen on the public services of a modern Western state. He has passed two emergency budgets to stop the deficit soaring to 15pc of GDP. They have not been enough. The expert An Bord Snip report said last week that Dublin must cut deeper, or risk a disastrous debt compound trap. A further 17,000 state jobs must go (equal to 1.25m in the US), though unemployment is already 12pc and heading for 16pc next year. Education must be cut 8pc. Scores of rural schools must close, and 6,900 teachers must go....Nobody is spared. Social welfare payments must be cut 5pc, child benefit by 20pc. The Garda (police), already smarting from a 7pc pay cut, may have to buy their own uniforms. Hospital visits could cost £107 a day, etc, etc.... No doubt Ireland has been the victim of a savagely tight monetary policy – given its specific needs. But the deeper truth is that Britain, Spain, France, Germany, Italy, the US, and Japan are in varying states of fiscal ruin, and those tipping into demographic decline (unlike young Ireland) have an underlying cancer that is even more deadly. The West cannot support its gold-plated state structures from an aging workforce and depleted tax base. As the International Monetary Fund made clear last week, Britain is lucky that markets have not yet imposed a "penalty interest" on British Gilts, given the trajectory of UK national debt – now vaulting towards 100pc of GDP – and the scandalous refusal of this Government to map out any path back to solvency. "The UK has been getting the benefit of the doubt, both in the Government bond market and also the foreign exchange market. This benefit of the doubt is not going to last forever," said the Fund. France and Italy have been less abject, but they began with higher borrowing needs. Italy's debt is expected to reach the danger level of 120pc next year, according to leaked Treasury documents. France's debt will near 90pc next year if President Nicolas Sarkozy goes ahead with his "Grand Emprunt", a fiscal blitz masquerading as investment. There was a case for an emergency boost last winter to cushion the blow as global industry crashed. That moment has passed. While I agree with Nomura's Richard Koo that the US, Britain, and Europe risk a deflationary slump along the lines of Japan's Lost Decade (two decades really), I am ever more wary of his calls for Keynesian spending a l'outrance. Such policies have crippled Japan. A string of make-work stimulus plans – famously building bridges to nowhere in Hokkaido e_SEmD has ensured that the day of reckoning will be worse, when it comes. The IMF says Japan's gross public debt will reach 240pc of GDP by 2014 e_SEmD beyond the point of recovery for a nation with a contracting workforce. Sooner or later, Japan's bond market will blow up. Error One was to permit a bubble in the 1980s. Error Two was to wait a decade before opting for monetary "shock and awe" through quantitative easing. The US Federal Reserve has moved faster but already seems to think the job is done. "Quantitative tightening" has begun. Its balance sheet has contracted by almost $200bn (£122bn) from the peak. The M2 money supply has stagnated since January. The Fed is talking of "exit strategies". Is this a replay of mid-2008 when the Fed lost its nerve, bristling over criticism that it had cut rates too low (then 2pc)? Remember what happened. Fed hawks in Dallas, St Louis, and Atlanta talked of rate rises. That had consequences. Markets tightened in anticipation, and arguably triggered the collapse of Lehman Brothers, AIG, Fannie and Freddie that autumn. The Fed's doctrine – New Keynesian Synthesis – has let it down time and again in this long saga, and there is scant evidence that Fed officials recognise the fact. As for the European Central Bank, it has let private loan growth contract this summer. The imperative for the debt-bloated West is to cut spending systematically for year after year, off-setting the deflationary effect with monetary stimulus. This is the only mix that can save us. My awful fear is that we will do exactly the opposite, incubating yet another crisis this autumn, to which we will respond with yet further spending. This is the road to ruin. What If? By Paul McCulley, Managing Director, PIMCO The whole world, it seems, is wrapped around the axle about exit strategies from putatively unsustainable policies: (1) the Fed's bloated balance sheet, with some $800 billion of excess reserves sloshing 'round the banking system, in the context of an effective zero Fed funds rate; and (2) the Treasury's huge budget deficit, unprecedented in peace time and set to stay huge, implying a Treasury debt/GDP ratio approaching 100% within a decade's time. For some, usually with Monetarist roots, this combination of policies is a classic brew for a major bout of inflation (eventually, it is always stressed). For others, usually with Austrian tendencies, this policy brew is a deflationary force, as it will provoke foreign investors to flee both the dollar and Treasuries, driving up real interest rates, pole axing any revival in risk asset prices, themselves backed by the fruits of bubble-driven mal-investment. And, I'm quite sure, there are some with a foot in both camps. So it's not easy to actually define conventional, or consensus, wisdom. In fact, many of my Keynesian brethren seem to be struggling with what to do, arguing against any further near-term fiscal stimulus, or at least unless enacted simultaneously with long-term fiscal restraint. Indeed, I recently publicly uttered something along these lines, though I hedged myself by saying long-term fiscal responsibility rather than restraint (responsibility is in the eye of the beholder, while restraint is more categorical). In any event, there does not seem to be any serious consensus as to how the policy mix should be adjusted, if at all, despite clear and present evidence of massive unemployment and underemployment, which is putting downward pressure on nominal personal income (the product of fewer jobs, fewer hours and decelerating wages, almost to the zero line). This is not the stuff of a self-sustaining revival in aggregate demand. Thus, my tentative conclusion is that maybe the consensus professional economist view is that America should simply accept that it's going to have its version of Japan's lost decade, the Calvinist aftermath of the preceding sin of booming growth on the back of ever-increasing leverage and mal-investment. But if that sobering view is indeed the new consensus, shame on my profession! There is another way. And, irony of ironies, it is not a new way, but rather an old way, one defined by no less than Paul Krugman in 1998 and Ben Bernanke in 2003, when lecturing Japan about what to do. I have enormous respect for the intellectual horsepower of both men, and what they preached back then deserves a re-preaching, even if I'm the humble preacher that must take the pulpit. Krugman in May 1998 In a delightfully wonkish paper,1 using the enormous horsepower of the IS-LM (investment savings-liquidity preference money supply equilibrium) framework, he made a powerful case for what Japan should do to bootstrap itself out of the deflationary swamp. I'll spare you the wonkish part and cut to his commonsensical conclusion. In the midst of deflation in the context of a liquidity trap, with the central bank's policy rate pinned at zero, it is not enough for the central bank to print money, accommodating massive fiscal policy stimulus, he argued. Not that this is not a necessary policy action. It is. But it is not sufficient, Krugman pounded the table, because if the public believes that the central bank will, in the future, un-print the money – in today's jargon, implement an exit strategy from money printing – then the printed money will simply be hoarded, rather than spent, because deflationary expectations will remain entrenched. To get the public to spend the money, Krugman argued, the central bank should make clear that the printed money will remain printed, shifting deflationary expectations to inflationary expectations.  In his famous conclusion, actually advice to the Bank of Japan, Krugman declared (his italics, not mine): "The way to make monetary policy effective is for the central bank to credibly promise to be irresponsible – to make a persuasive case that it will permit inflation to occur, thereby producing the negative real interest rates the economy needs." In a follow-up (similarly wonkish) paper2 in 1999, Professor Krugman refined his argument, stressing that the core of his thesis could be implemented through a credible inflation target that was appreciably higher than the prevailing negative inflation rate in Japan. Thus, he was not so much arguing that the Bank of Japan should act irresponsibly, but rather act irresponsibly relative to orthodox, conventional thinking, which itself was irresponsible, in that it emphasized the need for an eventual exit strategy from liquidity trap-motivated money printing. To get out of the trap, he emphasized, the central bank needed to radically change expectations to the notion that there was no exit strategy, at least until inflation was appreciably higher – not just inflation expectations, but inflation itself. Only then would the commitment to higher inflation be credible, with the central bank not just talking the reflationary talk, but walking the reflationary walk, turning deflationary swamp water into reflationary wine. Naturally, the Bank of Japan didn't listen to Krugman at the time; orthodoxy is as orthodoxy does. In March 2001, however, the Bank of Japan did serve up a small beer from the Krugman still, adopting Quantitative Easing (QE), re-enforcing its zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) with an explicit target for massive creation of excess reserves, committing to retaining that policy until the year-over-year core CPI moved above zero on a "stable" basis. A very small beer indeed. But to its credit, the Bank of Japan tiptoed the reflationary walk, sticking with QE for five years, exiting in March 2006, after the year-over-year core CPI had turned positive in November 2005. A small beer is better than no beer. Bernanke in May 2003 Professor Bernanke became Fed Governor Bernanke the prior year, making his most famous speech in November 2002, "Making Sure 'It' Doesn't Happen Here,"3 detailing the Fed's anti-deflationary toolbox. That's the speech that the markets are using as a roadmap for Chairman Bernanke's present anti-deflation policy path (it's actually been quite a good roadmap!). But a speech in May 2003, "Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan,"4 is equally important, I think, because it provides a roadmap for what the Fed might do if present anti-deflation policies prove to be inadequate to the task. The speech is not quite as wonkish as Krugman's May 1998 missive, but is still robustly analytical. Perhaps that's why my profession and the media do not give it the attention it deserves. But Mr. Bernanke's speech does have strong Occam's Razor conclusions, and they are eerily the same as Krugman's, perhaps even stronger. No, Mr. Bernanke did not advocate to the Bank of Japan that it credibly commit to acting irresponsibly, Krugman's clever turn of phrase. In fact, as noted above, Krugman didn't really, either; he simply wanted the Bank of Japan to act responsibly, which would be deemed irresponsible in the context of orthodox thinking. Both men know how to think outside the proverbial box! At the time, Mr. Bernanke was a table-thumping advocate for the Fed to adopt an explicit inflation target. But in Japan, he upped that analytical ante by advocating that the Bank of Japan adopt a price level target, not an inflation target. And there is a huge difference. An inflation target "forgives" past deflation (or below inflation target) sins. In contrast, a price level target does not forgive those sins, but rather demands that the central bank atone for them by explicitly pursuing sufficient inflation to restore the price level to a plateau that would have been achieved if those sins had not been committed. More specifically, he advocated that the Bank of Japan should (his italics, not mine): "... announce its intention to restore the price level (as measured by some standard index of prices, such as the consumer price index excluding fresh food) to the value it would have reached if, instead of the deflation of the past five years, a moderate inflation of, say, 1 percent per year had occurred. (I choose 1 percent to allow for the measurement bias issue noted above, and because a slightly positive average rate of inflation reduces the risk of future episodes of sustained deflation.) Note that the proposed price-level target is a moving target, equal in the year 2003 to a value approximately 5 percent above the actual price level in 1998 and rising 1 percent per year thereafter. Because deflation implies falling prices while the target price-level rises, the failure to end deflation in a given year has the effect of increasing what I have called the price-level gap. The price-level gap is the difference between the actual price level and the price level that would have obtained if deflation had been avoided and the price stability objective achieved in the first place. A successful effort to eliminate the price-level gap would proceed, roughly, in two stages. During the first stage, the inflation rate would exceed the long-term desired inflation rate, as the price-level gap was eliminated and the effects of previous deflation undone. Call this the reflationary phase of policy. Second, once the price-level target was reached, or nearly so, the objective for policy would become a conventional inflation target or a price-level target that increases over time at the average desired rate of inflation." This is very powerful stuff! Mr. Bernanke knew he was breaking some new ground, at least from the mouth of a sitting policymaker. In actuality, he was drawing on some powerful academic work of Eggertsson and Woodford,5 which laid out the case that a price level target would likely have a more powerful effect on inflation expectations than simply an inflation target above the prevailing level of inflation (or in Japan's case, deflation). How so? A price level target pegged at the starting point of a period of deflation – or below target inflation – implies that the central bank is explicitly committed to reflation, meaning that in the short-to-intermediate term, the central bank will explicitly aim for an inflation rate that is higher than its long-term "desired" rate. Mr. Bernanke recognized that such a policy could unmoor long-term inflation expectations, creating a deleterious rise in long-term interest rates. But in his view, this was a risk worth taking, in part because he felt that a central banker with strong communications skills could draw a distinction between (1) a one-time reflation to correct a deflated price level back up to a level that would have been achieved in the absence of deflationary sins and (2) the central bank's long-term inflation objective. But he acknowledged it would be tricky. But his case didn't rest simply on skilled central bank communications. While he felt that generating a positive shock to short-to-intermediate inflation expectations would have the effect of reducing real interest rates (remember, the real rate is the nominal rate minus inflation expectations), he did not think that effect was assured and even if it was, he did not believe it would be sufficient to stimulate private sector aggregate demand robust enough to reduce Japan's output gap. Thus, he advocated explicit cooperation between the fiscal authority and the monetary authority, with the latter subordinating itself to the former. And you thought Krugman was radical! While the passage on this topic6 in Bernanke's speech is a bit long, it is so powerful that I think it deserves a full hearing. Here it is: "My thesis here is that cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities in Japan could help solve the problems that each policymaker faces on its own. Consider for example a tax cut for households and businesses that is explicitly coupled with incremental BOJ purchases of government debt – so that the tax cut is in effect financed by money creation. Moreover, assume that the Bank of Japan has made a commitment, by announcing a price-level target, to reflate the economy, so that much or all of the increase in the money stock is viewed as permanent. Under this plan, the BOJ's balance sheet is protected by the bond conversion program,7 and the government's concerns about its outstanding stock of debt are mitigated because increases in its debt are purchased by the BOJ rather than sold to the private sector. Moreover, consumers and businesses should be willing to spend rather than save the bulk of their tax cut: They have extra cash on hand, but – because the BOJ purchased government debt in the amount of the tax cut – no current or future debt service burden has been created to imply increased future taxes. Essentially, monetary and fiscal policies together have increased the nominal wealth of the household sector, which will increase nominal spending and hence prices. The health of the banking sector is irrelevant to this means of transmitting the expansionary effect of monetary policy, addressing the concern of BOJ officials about 'broken' channels of monetary transmission. This approach also responds to the reservation of BOJ officials that the Bank "lacks the tools" to reach a price-level or inflation target. Isn't it irresponsible to recommend a tax cut, given the poor state of Japanese public finances? To the contrary, from a fiscal perspective, the policy would almost certainly be stabilizing, in the sense of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. The BOJ's purchases would leave the nominal quantity of debt in the hands of the public unchanged, while nominal GDP would rise owing to increased nominal spending. Indeed, nothing would help reduce Japan's fiscal woes more than healthy growth in nominal GDP and hence in tax revenues. Potential roles for monetary-fiscal cooperation are not limited to BOJ support of tax cuts. BOJ purchases of government debt could also support spending programs, to facilitate industrial restructuring, for example. The BOJ's purchases would mitigate the effect of the new spending on the burden of debt and future interest payments perceived by households, which should reduce the offset from decreased consumption. More generally, by replacing interest-bearing debt with money, BOJ purchases of government debt lower current deficits and interest burdens and thus the public's expectations of future tax obligations. Of course, one can never get something for nothing; from a public finance perspective, increased monetization of government debt simply amounts to replacing other forms of taxes with an inflation tax. But, in the context of deflation-ridden Japan, generating a little bit of positive inflation (and the associated increase in nominal spending) would help achieve the goals of promoting economic recovery and putting idle resources back to work, which in turn would boost tax revenue and improve the government's fiscal position." Powerful, powerful stuff! And Now to the USA at Present The United States is not presently suffering deflation in goods and services prices, although the core CPI has dipped slightly below the Fed's putative 2% "target." So the extreme measures that Krugman and Bernanke advocated for Japan do not translate fully to the United States. But they do translate a lot more than the consensus is even willing to discuss in politically correct circles. America is in a liquidity trap, driven by private sector deleveraging borne of asset price deflation, meaning that private sector demand for credit is axiomatically flat to negative, despite a Fed funds rate pinned against zero. The only source of credit demand growth in the United States is the Treasury itself. And until the deleveraging process runs its course, consensus agrees that there is nothing wrong with such bloated Treasury demand for credit: In a recessionary foxhole, Keynesian religion dominates all other economic religions. But not all believers are equally devout, as noted at the outset, with many against any further ramping up of Keynesian stimulus, at least without a contemporaneous move to ensure long-term fiscal responsibility, so as to prevent a deleterious increase in long-term Treasury interest rates. So what should Washington do, if and when – and I stress "if and when"; I'm not making a forecast here! – private sector aggregate (nominal) demand growth looks like it's going to languish in Japan style for the indefinite future? The answer: Take one cup of Krugman's advice for Japan and two cups of Bernanke's advice for Japan – responsibly act irresponsibly relative to orthodoxy. Yes, as Bernanke intoned, there are no free lunches. But no lunch doesn't work for me. Or the American people. While it is true, as Keynes intoned, that we are all dead in the long run, I see no reason to die young from orthodoxy-imposed anorexia. "Japan's Trap," http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/japtrap.html "Thinking About the Liquidity Trap," http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/trioshrt.html http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030531/default.htm Gauti Eggertsson, and Michael Woodford (2003). "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," http://www.columbia.edu/~mw2230/BPEA.pdf In this case, Bernanke was drawing on his own work, a no-punches-pulled academic essay from December 1999, "Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis." For the wonks amongst you that haven't read it, I strongly urge that you do so! Elsewhere in the speech, Bernanke lays out a framework, via an interest rate swap arrangement, for the fiscal authority to assume any losses for the central bank from interest rate risks on its bond purchases, so as to bury that political red herring. As an economic matter, such losses are of no importance when looking at the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary authority and the fiscal authority: If government bond prices go down, the central bank loses money from a mark-to-market accounting perspective, but the fiscal authority makes exactly the same amount from a mark-to-market accounting perspective. John F. Mauldin johnmauldin@investorsinsight.com You are currently subscribed as jmiller2000@verizon.net. To unsubscribe, go here. Reproductions. If you would like to reproduce any of John Mauldin's E-Letters or commentary, you must include the source of your quote and the following email address: JohnMauldin@InvestorsInsight.com. Please write to Reproductions@InvestorsInsight.com and inform us of any reproductions including where and when the copy will be reproduced. Note: John Mauldin is the President of Millennium Wave Advisors, LLC (MWA), which is an investment advisory firm registered with multiple states. 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