Saturday, January 31, 2009

Fw: Trading with the Big Boys - John Mauldin's Weekly E-Letter

 

Sent: Saturday, January 31, 2009 12:03 AM
Subject: Trading with the Big Boys - John Mauldin's Weekly E-Letter

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Thoughts from the Frontline Weekly Newsletter
Trading With the Big Boys
by John Mauldin
January 30, 2009
Visit John's MySpace Page

In this issue:
Trading With the Big Boys
FusionIQ
GM, AIG, and Alcoa -- Are They Still in Your Portfolio?
La Jolla, New York, and Las Vegas

This week we are going to do something a little different. I am in Bermuda taking a little weekend R&R after a speech, as well as working on my book. There is not the time for the usual letter this week, but I have asked Barry Ritholtz to write about his new trading program, FusionIQ, for reasons I will talk about below.

But first, and quickly, if you are planning on attending my Strategic Investment Conference this April 2-4 you need to act soon. You can get more details at the end of the letter. And the first of the "Conversations with John Mauldin" is up. We recorded it this week, with Ed Easterling and Dr. Lacy Hunt. I thought it went very well for an inaugural talk. The transcript is there already. For those who have subscribed, you should have received an email and be able to log in and listen or read the transcript. And I welcome feedback as we launch this new service. And I want to thank Tiffani, Ryan, and Anne in my office, who have worked long hours getting this ready. There is a lot of back-room work that has to be done to make something like this available, and I am happy to have their support.

Warning: This e-letter is about a new trading platform that I think is interesting. While not trying to be promotional, it will offer you a product at the end. As I write below, there is reason to think about what tools other are using when you are trading against them; but for those of you who are looking for economic analysis, skip this and wait till next week, when I am back in the office. For the rest of us, let's jump right in.

Trading With the Big Boys

Tough market!

That's something I hear in the office every day -- from professional traders, money managers, and hedge funds. These markets have been brutal, and the competition has been relentless.

For the individual investor, it is important to understand who your opponents are on the field of battle. Sports and war metaphors abound, because they are consistent with what you are going up against each day. In addition to always battling Mr. Market, as tough an opponent as there is, your rivals are also anyone else buying or selling stocks. They, too, are looking for ways to produce positive returns.

Consider what Charles Ellis, who helps oversee the $15-billion endowment fund at Yale University, said:

"Watch a pro football game, and it's obvious the guys on the field are far faster, stronger and more willing to bear and inflict pain than you are. Surely you would say, 'I don't want to play against those guys!'

Well, 90% of stock market volume is done by institutions, and half of that is done by the world's 50 largest investment firms, deeply committed, vastly well prepared -- the smartest sons of bitches in the world working their tails off all day long. You know what? I don't want to play against those guys either."

That's a brutal and very honest observation. The institutions Ellis refers to are mutual funds, hedge funds, and program traders -- and all of their professional staff, mathematicians, and researchers. The pros are deploying every possible tool to give them whatever edge they can get. And even they can have a hard time, as most of them will testify to the difficulty of trading in 2008.

Despite this daunting opposition, many individuals unhesitatingly step onto the playing field with the pros. To carry the sports metaphor further, they end up receiving season-ending injuries to their investment and retirement accounts.

My "day job" is finding money managers for clients. It is fair to say I have looked at many hundreds of managers and funds over the last 20 years. I have also talked with countless people who want to break into the investment management business. I must admit I am not always the most encouraging, as my experience says it is a tough world. But there are those who do indeed make it. Some very successful traders are small shops, while others grow into large management businesses.

But they do have one thing in common. They have an edge. Somewhere, somehow, they have developed an edge which gives them the ability to eke out profits, whether from trading stocks or commodities or currencies.

That's why it is so important to be prepared -- mentally, physically, and with the right equipment. It's not just guns and ammo, but intel and recon tools as well. The explosion of cheap PC power and web-based market data may have given everyone similar technology, but it did not grant them an equal ability to use them. Just as picking up a 5 iron doesn't make you Tiger Woods, sitting in front of a PC doesn't make you Jim Simons (Renaissance Technologies). There is a huge difference between accessing data and the knowledge of how to use it.

I have asked Barry Ritholtz (you may know him through his blog The Big Picture and appearances on CNBC) to write today about his new trading and statistical platform, FusionIQ. Barry is a successful, no-nonsense, take-no-prisoners type of trader. His rather blunt manner that you see on TV is what you get in real life. We have become good friends. I have watched him develop this software for the last few years, and I like it, as it marries fundamental and technical analysis. This is what Barron's had to say about the software:

"FUSIONIQ'S MODELS blend fundamental and technical metrics to determine the strength of some 8,000 publicly traded equities. They identify the most tradable issues and sectors with the lowest component of risk. FusionIQ also finds issues with unusual short-term strength or weakness, issuing Buy and Sell signals accordingly. In general, FusionIQ recommends subscribers hold a rolling portfolio of 15 to 20 issues for the intermediate term.

"Beyond that, it identifies trading opportunities. FusionIQ models pinpoint highly ranked issues whose prices suddenly gap up 5% or more on high volume (and other conditions). They also issue alerts when analysts with good track records offer earnings forecasts outside peer estimates, and when short squeezes are in the offing -- that is, when a highly shorted issue exhibits enough relative strength to force short sellers to cover their positions and boost the price further."

There are three reasons I am bringing this to your attention today. First, there are tens of thousands of investment professionals out there who have lost their jobs in recent months. I was told last month that the number of people sitting for the CFA exams is the highest on record. The explosion of young people coming out of school looking for a job in the financial world is at an all-time high. I get calls and letters from them all the time asking for advice.

I feel somewhat uncomfortable with myself when asked what to do. I know the odds, as the financial world is down-sizing, and there are some really capable and experienced people on the street today. There are just going to be fewer jobs. That is the reality. But I also know that if you can make it, it can be a very rewarding and fascinating career, with some of the most exciting and switched-on people anywhere. I am literally having more fun than I ever have. And telling someone not to chase his dream? I don't want to do that, but I do want to be honest.

So, if you want to be a trader, listen up to what Barry is talking about, and know that you are dealing with people who AT A MINIMUM are armed with technology like this. I have been on some of the largest trading floors in the world. The tech at their disposal, the data they can call up, the research they can marshal, is impressive. Barry and his partners have spent literally millions. The big trading houses have spent tens of millions. It is not as easy as those commercials on TV make it sound. These pros spend hours learning their systems in front of a screen.

Second, Tiffani and I have been interviewing millionaires for our new book. I can't tell you how many have ridden this market down. The size of their portfolios does not make them better money managers. They or their managers had no discipline for selling. Seriously, buy and hold in a secular bear market like we are in is a losing strategy. On an inflation-adjusted basis, you are down if your holding period has been 30 years! Most of us would think that 30 years is the long run! On a nominal basis, you are about where you were ten years ago, if you are in a broad index.

Even if you are a value investor, you have gotten creamed in this market. (Some great value investors are down 60%. Their experience of buying and holding solid companies, which had worked so well for so long, needs to be married with some risk discipline.) You need a sell discipline. Barry's system, or others like it, can at least get you thinking about selling rather than riding a stock all the way to the bottom and hoping it comes back. Hope is not a viable investment strategy.

I don't know much personally about trading. My stomach won't allow me to trade, although I have watched and met with the best. But I do know this. The best traders and managers have risk controls and sell disciplines and they stick to them. Period. They don't fall in love with a stock or a commodity position.

If you are going to manage your own portfolio, and there is nothing wrong with that if you will spend the time to do it right, then you have to learn to manage your risk. And while simple systems are better than nothing, a little sophistication here will pay for itself.

Third, a small set of you in the professional world will find FusionIQ something that you should use. As a professional tool, it is relatively cheap.

Finally, for the regular investor, realize that you are trading against thousands of people and funds who have tools like this -- and many have far better tools. This is just one version. If you or your manager are not getting the results you need, maybe you need to figure out how you get your stock and fund "tips." Maybe you should find a manager who "get's it."

FusionIQ is one of several very good analysis programs, and my allowing Barry to write about it is not saying this is the best. But it appears to me to be one of the better platforms I have seen. Now, let's let Barry talk about how long it took and how much it cost to develop this platform.

Do you really want to put on your pads and get out on that field? If so, then make sure you are ready to play!

FusionIQ

By Barry Ritholtz

As professionals who have been trading these markets for a collective 50 years, we have long been interested in the ways we can apply technology to tilt the odds in our favor. All the big proprietary trading desks -- banks like Goldman Sachs, huge hedge funds like Pequot and SAC -- spend tens of millions of dollars to assist their decision making.

We decided some time ago that if we wanted to compete on this playing field, we needed something to even up the odds.

During the tech wreck and dot com collapse of 2000-03, my partner Kevin Lane came up with an idea. What if we could create a database to track various indicators for stocks and markets? The idea was to pull only the most important stock factors into one location. Not to merely screen the market, but to actually rank all of the most popular stocks from worst to best, based on both earnings and ownership metrics, as well as the charts. This way, we would have a timely method to measure important technical AND fundamental metrics.

After years of brainstorming, we selected and, more importantly, eliminated a variety of stock metrics. Lots of back-testing went into the final product. We performed variable testing -- something called fractal analysis -- that would make your brain explode if you saw the mathematics of it (I know mine did!).

We found ourselves using the tool more and more. Kevin had famously recommended shorting both Enron and Tyco during the dot com crash, and the tool had a lot to do with that. (See this Business Week article: "Analysts Who Get It"

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_50/b3812104.htm)

With the goal of making smarter, more informed trading decisions, we sought ways to create better returns with less risk. By combining good fundamentals and strong technical momentum characteristics, we found we could identify not only what to buy or sell, but when.

The results with the product were impressive enough that we decided to spin it out as a web-based software product for investors. We procured pricing data and fundamental feeds, hired a programming team and designers. It took almost six months to create all of the algorithms, and over the latter half of 2002 and into 2003 we did the programming, web front-end displays, database, and back-end architecture. Then came more testing and refinement. Our venture and equity partners spent over $1 million in development costs alone, hiring a development staff of programmers and market analysts to continually test and refine the software. From 2004 to 2005, the program underwent significant beta testing and renewed analysis of the variables that create the ranking system.

In 2006, we formed Fusion Analytics Investment Partners LLC. Since then, we have poured in close to another $1 million in refinements. We developed new algorithms, and beta tested everything throughout 2007. The software was launched at the current site in late 2007.

How Does FusionIQ Work? The software uses our unique combination of fundamental and technical indicators to rank over 8000 stocks, ETFs, and closed-end funds. The rankings range from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). These provide insight into stocks that are more likely to outperform, as well as identifying what stocks should be avoided. From there, we apply our proprietary algorithms, generating BUY, SELL, and NEUTRAL signals. For more aggressive traders, the system identifies breakouts and breakdowns, buy and sell signals, short squeezes, and other trading opportunities.

For long-term investors, we developed a way to help manage risk in your holdings by creating a Portfolio Watchlist. This allows you to enter all of your current holdings, which are automatically ranked and monitored. You can easily keep tabs on your portfolio holdings as their FusionIQ rankings change. Stocks ranked 70 and higher are candidates to keep, while lower-rated stocks should be reviewed for removal from a portfolio. For investors who do not like the buy & hold mantra, you can trim your portfolio using our BUY, SELL, and NEUTRAL signals. These signals are generated when specific conditions are met. It is both objective and neutral.

In 2008, the sell signals helped us avoid a lot of trouble. We recommended selling or shorting Bear Stearns when it was over $100. We very publicly said the same about AIG in early 2008 (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avZEKuMTaGME). We told readers to sell Fannie Mae (over $40) and Lehman Brothers (over $30). While we caught some grief for these calls early on from fans of the companies, in the end our clients and investors thanked us. All of these calls were made via using the FusionIQ system.

Here are some recent signals and rankings from the FusionIQ software:

General Motors (GM)

Back in November, 2008, we looked again at General Motors, as it was under pressure, with liquidity concerns. The only hope seemed to be a big-time government bailout, or perhaps consolidation with another automobile/truck manufacturer.

We also noted that, once again, the large bulge-bracket research analysts were not exactly showing they were "value added" to investors or the investment community. Deutsche Bank's analyst cut GM from a hold to a sell with a price target of zero. We are not saying they were completely wrong, but where had they been? DB had a buy on GM until 2/25/08 at $31, then they had a hold on the stock all the way to $3.66, before they threw in the towel. (It is now marginally lower.)

We don't want to pick on only Deutsche Bank, as most of the analysts were using old earnings assumptions, and all seemed to come to the same conclusions ... and too late to do anything about it.

Using Fusion IQ screens, however, kept us ahead of the curve. As seen below on this yearly GM chart, our unbiased screening system has had GM ranked extremely low (an 18 Master, 10 Technical out of 100 as of that November date) with multiple sell

Triggers. These sell alerts would have woken an investor up that something was wrong with the underlying firm. That is something that will not show in the earnings or conference calls until it's too late.

GM CHART
November 10, 2008

GM Chart

Even more shocking than the GM chart is the AIG yearly chart. In addition to our ranking and timing indicators (see all the sells), Fusion Analytics published a sell on AIG for our institutional clients on 2/13/2008 at $46.14.

The first government bailout of AIG was not good enough, so they had to try, try again. In November, the US government announced that they would sweeten the pot in another attempt to save the firm. Hey, at least the taxpayers got an additional 2% stake in the firm!

AIG CHART

AIG Chart

It's not only the sells -- we find many buys this way too.

My partners and I are all chart watchers. We are always perusing FusionIQ for stocks in the trading screens section of the site. I look at all the breakouts/breakdowns and stocks that have had a recent short squeeze, looking for just the right technical setup before I try to ferret out a fundamental catalyst.

I also have charts that for some reason or another have caught my eye. When this occurs I place them in my FusionIQ watch list. This way, if the ranking improves, or a buy signal gets generated, I can see it right away. If I really like a chart, I will set a FusionIQ email alert to notify me when my trade conditions are met.

Recently Netflix Corp. (NFLX) caught our eye. As the chart below shows, NFLX had a new FusionIQ timing BUY signal in mid-December. Since then, despite the market's overall softness, there was technical strength in the stock. As seen below, NFLX shot up almost 30% since that buy signal.

NFLX CHART

NFLX Chart

More-active traders can use Fusion IQ's short-term trading signals. These are mostly technically based, as opposed to the Fusion of technical and fundamental data used to arrive at our scoring system. However, institutional clients geared towards fundamental research have found these to be a strong supplement to their basic research.

These trading signals can be used as a wakeup call that something may be changing and your analysts need to dig deeper. Also, many clients use these signals as a way to trade around their core holdings (adding alpha).

These charts that follow ... if you were long these names in your portfolio, do you think these heads-up might have helped?

These names have all come off long Sells, too. Perhaps it's time to relook at them!

ALCOA CHART

ALCOA Chart

SEPRACOR CHART

SEPRACOR Chart

MOSIAC CHART

MOSIAC Chart

If you would like to know more or get a subscription, the price to John's readers is $39.95 a month, and you will get the full professional system as part of this introductory offer.

La Jolla, New York, and Las Vegas

As I mentioned at the beginning of this letter, along with my partners Altegris Investments I will be co-hosting our 6th annual Strategic Investment Conference in La Jolla, California, April 2-4. I have invited some of the top economic minds in the country to come and address us, giving us their views on what seems to be a continuing crisis. It will be a mix of economic theory and practical investment advice.

Already committed to speak are Martin Barnes, Woody Brock, Dennis Gartman, Louis Gave, George Friedman (of Stratfor), and Paul McCulley. I anticipate adding another stellar name or two. This is as strong a lineup as we have ever had, and on par with any conference I know of anywhere. And as a special bonus, we have invited Fredrik Haren from Sweden. I heard him speak at a conference in Stockholm last year and was blown away. You can click on the link below to learn more about the speakers.

Due to securities regulations, attendance is limited to qualified high-net-worth investors and/or institutional investors, because we will be showcasing a select number of commodity fund managers and other alternative strategies. Early registrants will get a discount. Last year we had to close registration, and I anticipate we will run out of room again, so I would not procrastinate. Click this link to find out more and register: https://hedge-fund-conference.com/register.aspx. And if you cut and paste this link, make sure you copy the "https:" so you go to the secure site.

I am going to be in New York in the middle of March and then fly to Las Vegas to be with good friends Doug Casey, David Galland, and the crew for a weekend where I get to be the resident "bull" for a change. I will get you information on his conference next week, and hope to see you there.

It has been a few years since I have been to Bermuda, and it is as beautiful as I remember it. It really is, as Mark Twain said, a little bit of heaven on earth. And I want to thank Bill and Bini Yit for hosting us Tucker's Point. It is one of the more beautiful golf courses in the world, and they were so gracious.

It is time to hit the send button, as the restaurants will not stay open on my schedule. Have a great weekend.

Your didn't lose a ball today (we celebrate small triumphs) analyst,

John Mauldin
John@FrontLineThoughts.com

Copyright 2009 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved

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Monday, January 26, 2009

Fw: Geithner, China, and the Specter of Technical Insolvency - John Mauldin's Outside the Box E-Letter

 

Sent: Monday, January 26, 2009 7:07 PM
Subject: Geithner, China, and the Specter of Technical Insolvency - John Mauldin's Outside the Box E-Letter

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Volume 5 - Issue 14
January 26, 2009



Geithner, China, and the
Specter of Technical Insolvency
by David Kotok, Nouriel Roubini and Elisa Parisi-Capone

This week I bring you two different articles as an offering for Outside the Box. As a way to introduce the first, let me give you the quote from Merrill Lynch economist David Rosenberg about the rising threat of global trade protectionism:

"The Financial Times weighs in on the rising threat of global trade protectionism in today's Lex Column on page 14 ("Economic Patriotism"). The FT points out that the stimulus packages of many countries include "buy local" provisions. At home, there is a proposed inclusion of a 'Buy American' provision in the economic recovery package and this could set off trade retaliation from importers of US goods. Here is what the FT had to say, 'It was trade protectionism that made the 1930s Depression "Great". Congress would do well to understand that it is in everyone's interest to keep trade open today.'"

I have long written that the one thing that could derail my Muddle Through (at least eventually) view point is a return to trade protectionism. Nothing could be more devastating to the hopes of a recovery. Nothing could more surely turn a recession into a depression, and a global one at that.

David Kotok of Cumberland Advisors notes the very real problem with Tim Geithner's written testimony, threatening China and calling the manipulators, clearly making the point that this is Obama's policy. I did not have time to touch last Friday on the dangerous policy if it is that and not just rhetoric, but David says everything I would want to say and does it shortly and eloquently.

Second, several people requested a chance to look at the actual paper I cited in last week's Thoughts from the Frontline by Nouriel Roubini and Elisa Parisi-Capone of RGE Monitor (www.rgemonitor.com) on how they come up with an estimated potential loss of $3.6 trillion dollars in the US financial system. It makes for rather grim reading, but they go sector by sector to show where the losses are coming from.

Tomorrow I will hold my first "conversation" with Ed Easterling and Dr. Lacy Hunt. To find out more about how to listen in and still get the half price discount for the rest of this week at https://www.johnmauldin.com/newsletters2.html. Just enter the code JM33 when asked. Have a great week.

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box


ADVERTISEMENT
Swiss Franc at Everbank

Geithner, Obama and China
By David Kotok

Following Treasury Secretary designee Tim Geithner's public confirmation hearing, an extensive Q & A occurred in writing. We have posted a copy of the US Senate Finance Committee's 100-page text on our website. See: http://www.cumber.com/special/geithnerquestions2009.pdf. This is must reading for any serious investor, economist, strategist, analyst, or observer. In this text you will find what is on the minds of the Senators, and you will gain insight into the policies that will be forthcoming from the Obama administration.

One telling example is found in the following quote that has already created international consternation. Geithner twice answered questions about currency and China. In so doing he has placed the Obama administration squarely in the middle of the tension between the United States and the largest international buyer and holder of US debt: China. This happened as the same Obama administration is unveiling a package that will add to the TARP financing needs and the cyclical deficit financing needs and cause the United States to borrow about $2 trillion this year. Two trillion dollars of newly issued Treasury debt -- and this is how the question was answered. Not once but twice.

Geithner (on page 81 and again on page 95) answered: "President Obama -- backed by the conclusions of a broad range of economists -- believes that China is manipulating its currency. President Obama has pledged as President to use aggressively all the diplomatic avenues open to him to seek change in China's currency practices."

"Manipulation?" "Aggressively?" This is strong language. Geithner did not do this on his own authority. These are prepared answers. He is citing the new President, not once but twice.

China's response was fast and direct. China's commerce ministry said in Beijing that China "has never used so-called currency manipulation to gain benefits in its international trade. Directing unsubstantiated criticism at China on the exchange-rate issue will only help US protectionism and will not help towards a real solution to the issue."

Are we seeing the world's largest and third largest economies calling each other names in the middle of a global economic and financial meltdown?

The world is in recession. The economic growth rates in the major and mature economies are now negative numbers. In China the growth rate is at least 4 and maybe as much as 8 points below last year. All the governments of the world that are running deficits are enlarging them in order to finance stimulus packages. Their central banks are bringing the policy interest rates toward zero. Trillions will need to be borrowed by those governments. Either they will be financed by the outright massive printing of money through the central bank mechanism, or they will be financed by those in the world who have savings. China is the largest single holder of financial savings in the world. Japan is next.

Why are we picking a fight with China? The implied question is why are we alluding to one with Japan, whose currency is currently the strongest of the G4 majors? In a world where global finance is mostly in US dollars, British pounds, euros, and yen, this is engaging in a dangerous sport.

The pound has lost one third of its value against the dollar since the crisis began. It is destined to weaken more. The euro struggles because of the structural issue of having to conduct monetary policy in the sovereign debt of the various euro zone member countries. The gap between those sovereign interest rates has reached nearly 3% between the weakest and strongest. This is an extremely difficult task for the European Central Bank to manage.

And Japan is getting killed by the flight to the strong yen. Japan will intervene soon to weaken the yen; they have as much as said so. The yen is strengthening against the Chinese Yuan; that is Japan's largest trading partner. The yen is 1.5 standard deviations above the JPY/USD exchange rate. It is nearly 3 standard deviations above the JPY/EUR cross rate that has been established during the ten years the euro existed. And it is over 3 standard deviations above the JPY/GBP cross rate.

So that leaves the dollar likely to get stronger. Right now it is the default choice of the world. We have currency strength not because we are so desirable but because we are currently better than the others. All bad; we're not as bad as they are. Or all bad and the others are even worse.

So what do we do within 72 hours of launching the Obama administration that says it is seeking "change?" We fire the first public salvo in what could easily become a trade war or a threat to global financial integration.

What makes us so credible? Is it our proven record of regulatory oversight of our financial markets, as demonstrated by the Madoff scandal and the SEC? Is it the way our rating agencies work so diligently to place a coveted "AAA" on paper that was peddled to the rest of the world and was found out to be highly toxic? Is it the way we honor the promises of federal agencies by having tier-one-eligible Fannie and Freddie preferred held in the US and abroad by institutions, and then essentially cause a structural default on that preferred (actually, dividend suspension)? Or is it the way the actions of Treasury and the Federal Reserve allowed a primary dealer (Lehman) to fail, thus triggering a global contagion?

C'mon? Where is the plan to restore confidence and credibility and transparency and consistent policy for the United States? And how does the Obama administration believe that launching a fight with China is beneficial?

In the 1930s the severe recession of 1929-1931 was turned into the depression of 1931-1933 because of protectionism. Every historian knows that. Every economist learns it in school. This is well-known by Geithner and even better-known by Larry Summers and Paul Volcker. They are the three members of the Obama economic troika.

The statement Geithner repeated twice was certainly known to them in advance. Why did they not temper it? What is the plan? Do they want to threaten and see if China backs down? This, too, is dangerous. Do they intend to pursue the Schumer tariff scheme? There are more questions than answers.

Lastly, Larry Summers was going to attend the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. He has cancelled. Why? Was it because he did not want to have to face the private conversations that would follow such statements as have been made by Geithner in the name of the President?

Watch Davos closely. And remember that the absence of statements is as revealing, if not more so, than the presence of them. Not one mention of trade openness appears in our reading of the 100 pages of answers to the Senate. Maybe someone else can find an affirmation of free and open trade. I cannot.

We fear protectionism. It starts with rhetoric. We now have that threat. If it is pursued, it ends badly for everyone. No one wins.

Geithner's answers are sobering. We are now in the realm of fiscal policy and national policy. This is not in the realm of the central bank; the Federal Reserve is not the player here. The Fed is doing all it can to unfreeze the financial system and restore it to functionality. If permitted to complete its task, that policy will work. If stymied or corrupted by conflicting policy in trade or federal finance, the recession will worsen and the pain will become more severe.


Specter of Technical Insolvency for the Banking System Calls for Comprehensive Solution

By Nouriel Roubini and Elisa Parisi-Capone

Back in February 2008, we at RGE Monitor warned that that the credit losses of this financial crisis would amount to at least $1 trillion and most likely closer to $2 trillion.

At that time such estimates were derided as being exaggerated as the market consensus at that time was around $200-300 billion of subprime mortgage related losses. But we pointed out that losses were not limited to subprime mortgages and would rapidly mount -- following a severe US and global recession -- to near prime and prime mortgages, commercial real estate loans, credit card loans, auto loans, student loans, leveraged loans, muni bonds, industrial and commercial loans, loans to real estate developers and contractors, corporate bonds, CDS and the securities (MBS, CDOs, CMOs, CPDOs, and the entire alphabet soup of derivative instruments) that -- via securitization -- represented claims on these underlying loans.

Soon enough, market estimates of loan and securities losses mounted: by April 2008 the IMF estimated them to be $945 billion; then Goldman Sachs came with an estimate of $1.1 trillion; the hedge fund manager John Paulson estimated them at $1.3 trillion; then in the fall of 2008 the IMF increased its estimate to $1.4 trillion; Bridgewater Associates came with an estimate of $1.6 trillion; and most recently, in December 2008, Goldman Sachs cites some estimates close to $2 trillion (and argues that loan losses alone may be as high as $1.6 trillion and expects a further $1.1 trillion of loan losses ahead).

In mid-November 2008, the threshold of $1 trillion in global financial writedowns was finally reached. Thus, as we argued throughout 2008, our $1 trillion estimate was only a floor - not a ceiling - for eventual losses and our upper range of $2 trillion would become more likely.

We have now revised our estimates and we now expect that total loan losses for loans originated by U.S. financial institutions will peak at up to $1.6 trillion out of $12.37 trillion loans . Our estimates assume that national house prices will fall another 20% before they bottom out some time in 2010 and that the unemployment rate will peak at 9%. If we include then around $2 trillion mark-to-market losses of securitized assets based on market prices as of December 2008 (out of $10.84 trillion in securities), total losses on the loans and securities originated by the U.S. financial system amount to a figure close to $3.6 trillion.

U.S. banks and broker dealers are estimated to incur about half of these losses, or $1.8 trillion ($1 -1.1 trillion loan losses and $600-700bn in securities writedowns) as 40% of securitizations are assumed to be held abroad. The $1.8 trillion figure compares to banks and broker dealers capital of $1.4 trillion as of Q3 of 2008, leaving the banking system borderline insolvent even if writedowns on securitizations are excluded.

Arguably, mark-to-market losses on private sector securitizations have so far been largely compensated for by increased activity in the government-sponsored sectors, but mark-to-market writedowns may become a more important factor going forward for bank capitalizations and credit provision to the private sector (see discussion in Hatzius (2008))

Moreover, even assuming that securitized assets may have fallen in value excessively because of a liquidity premium -- rather than credit risk alone -- we still get very large losses. Assume -- generously -- that securities are now underpriced because of illiquidity and that market losses will be eventually 20% lower than we currently estimate because of such temporary factors. Then writedowns on market securities would be $1.6 trillion rather than $2 trillion and total credit losses would be $3.2 trillion rather than $3.6 trillion.

In this paper we argue that, in order to restore safe credit growth, the U.S. banking system thus needs an additional $1 -- 1.4 trillion in private and/or public capital. These magnitudes call for a comprehensive solution along the lines of a 'bad bank', or preferably a restructuring of the financial system through an RTC or our through our HOME proposal.

Loss Estimates

Our data on outstanding loan and securities amounts are as in IMF Global Financial Stability Report, Table 1.1, as well as the weights in assigning loss shares to banks and non-bank (see data in Appendix 1).Different from the IMF which focuses on charge-offs only, we look at both charge-off and delinquency rates as we assume a high proportion of delinquent loans will turn bad in this cycle, especially as financial institutions have thin capital bases inadequate to deal with unexpected losses.

Compared to the IMF we estimate for loan losses based not on current default/ delinquencies rates but rather what those losses will be when such default and delinquencies will reach their peak some time in 2010. Our calculations are assume a further 20% fall in house prices (Case/Shiller) and unemployment peaking at 9% during this cycle as discussed in the RGE 2009 Global Economic Outlook.

With respect to credit losses on unsecuritized loans, recent research by the Federal Reserve Board (Sherlund (2008)) using comparable house price assumptions (but assuming high oil prices) concludes that over half of 2006-2007 subprime mortgage originations are set to default (i.e. $150bn out of $300bn in our data). The loss trajectories for Alt-A loans are similar, resulting in a 25% default rate ($150bn out of $600bn). Even prime mortgage delinquencies display a very high correlation with subprime loan delinquencies (Doms/Furlong/Krainer (2008), implying an approximate 7% default rate when the potential for 'jingle mail' is taken into account ($266bn out of $3,800bn). Our dollar losses for the subprime and Alt-A categories (incl. RMBS) are broadly in line with similar estimates in the literature.

The cycle has also turned in the commercial real estate (CRE) area with the traditional lag of around 2 years. Current serious delinquency plus default rates of 5.9% of CRE loans (Fed data) are projected to increase to up to 17% by industry experts cited in a Fitch study referring to CMBS data and assuming a 25% fall in prices ($408bn out of $2.4 trillion.) This compares with a 1991 peak charge-off plus delinquency rate of 14.5%.

In the consumer loan area, we estimate credit card charge-off rates could increase to 13% in the worst case scenario. Adding a typical 4% delinquency rate during recessions, the total loan losses on unsecuritized consumer loans are projected to increase to $238bn out of $1.4 trillion.

The IMF warned that commercial and industrial loans (C&I) losses are likely to climb to historical peaks and potentially beyond in this cycle. Compared to past C&I loan loss rates, we project charge-off and delinquencies to reach 10% or $370bn out of $3.7 trillion of unsecuritized C&I loans. With regard to leveraged loans, the latest research by Boston Consulting/IESE Business School based on the 100 largest PE firms engaged in LBOs calculates an expected book loss from default of about 30%. This translates into $51bn in losses out of $170bn unsecuritized leverage loans.

Based on these calculations, RGE now expects total loan losses to the financial system to reach about $1.6 trillion out of $12.37 trillion of unsecuritized loans alone,

implying an aggregate default rate of over 13%. Applying IMF weights, the U.S. banking system (commercial banks and broker dealers) carries about 60-70% of unsecuritized loan losses, or around $1.1 trillion.

Total mark-to-market (mtm) writedowns on a further $10.8 trillion of U.S. originated securities outstanding reached about $2 trillion by the end 2008 based on cash bond and derivatives prices. In particular, applying Markit ABX prices to $1.1 trillion of outstanding subprime RMBS results in a mtm loss rate of 50%, or $550bn. Markit TABX prices also show that $400 billion ABS CDOs consisting of mostly junior subprime RMBS tranches are all but worthless by now and expected to remain that way (95% or 380bn month-to-month loss.)

Writedowns in the prime MBS universe are primarily driven by jumbo mortgages which we assume to trade at 97% based on the record 3% spread between the 30-year jumbo mortgage and the 10-year Treasury yield with comparable average maturity. Mtm losses on prime MBS are therefore assumed to be $114bn out of $3.8 trillion outstanding. CMBX spreads spiked up implying a month-to-month write down of about $282bn out of $940bn outstanding.

The aggregate consumer debt ABS price index across all ratings trades at 80% thus implying $130bn in month-to-month writedowns out of $650bn outstanding. The high-yield corporate debt index traded at 75% (month-to-month $150bn out of $600bn), whereas high-grade corporate debt traded at 95% before moving back to 100%: we assume a writedown of $190bn out of $3.8 trillion. Derivatives indices for securitized leveraged loans implied a month-to-month loss of 123bn by the end of 2008 out of $350bn in CLOs outstanding. Flow of funds data show that 40% of U.S. originated securitizations are held abroad, leaving U.S. institutions with 60% of m-t-m writedowns, and U.S. banks in particular with a share of 50-60% thereof, i.e. $600 --700bn, when applying IMF weights.

Expected U.S. banks loan losses of about $1.1 trillion out of a total $1.6 trillion, plus bank month-to-month writedowns of $600 - $700bn on securities based on December 2008 prices amount to about $1.8 trillion. Compared with a total bank capitalization of $1.4 trillion (incl. FDIC insured plus investment banks as of Q3), the estimated capital shortfall amounts to around $400bn in the worst case scenario before recapitalization.

(Our colleague Christopher Whalen of Institutional Risk Analytics -- one of the leading experts of U.S. banking - has long predicted that peak charge-offs for the US banking industry will reach 2x 1990 levels during 2009, which would mean 4% charge-offs against total loans and leases for all FDIC insured banks or some $800 billion in realized losses. In reviewing a draft of our paper, Chris noted that the Q4 2008 results from Citi, JPMorgan, Bank of America show that charge-offs were running at a rate roughly double 2007 levels and that he expects charge-offs for these larger banks to double again by Q2 2009 and to continue rising through the second half of 2009. He thinks that our "$1.1t loss estimate is very reasonable for the financials in terms of charge-offs". The total accumulated loss for all FDIC insured banks will depend upon how long the industry remains at this peak level of loss experience; thus, our loss estimates for U.S. banks losses could be conservative and losses may end up being much larger than we predict.

Even including the TARP 1 injection of capital of $230 billion into the banking system and the further $200 billion of capital injected by private investors and sovereign wealth funds since the start of the crisis, the overall banking system would still be borderline insolvent.

Moreover, in order to restore the capital of the banking system to the previous level of $1.4 trillion (a level close to the 8% capital requirement of Basel II) an additional $1.4 trillion of private and public/government capital would have to be injected in the banking system to restore safe credit growth. If a reform of the regime of regulation of banking institutions were to argue that banks and broker dealers need more than the Basel II 8% criteria to operate safely even more than $1.4 trillion of new capital will have to be injected in the banking system.

Thus, even the release of TARP 2 (another $350 billion) and its use to recapitalize banks only would not be sufficient to restore the capital of banks and broker dealers to internationally accepted capital ratios. A TARP 3 and 4 of up to $1.05 trillion (assuming generously that all of TARP 2 goes to banks and broker dealers) may be needed to restore capital ratios to adequate levels.

Even assuming that private and foreign capital would contribute to 50% of this additional required recapitalization an additional TARP 3-4 of $560 billion may be needed in the form of public capital injections in banks and broker dealers alone. This would leave out the insurance companies, finance companies and other financial institutions (the GMAC, GE Capital, etc.) which may also need further public capital. Our estimates may turn out to be too pessimistic as the current illiquidity premium in prices of securities may disappear over time and a faster than expected growth recovery may reduce the expected losses on loans. But even in that case the current shortfall of capital in the banking system would be close to a staggering $1 trillion rather than an even bigger $1.4 trillion.

Conversely, credit losses may turn out to be even larger than we estimate: if instead of a U-shaped recession that is over by the end of 2009, the US recession were to last well into 2010 and turn out to be a Japanese style L-shaped recession, total loan and especially securities losses would end up being much larger than our benchmark of $3.6 trillion, potentially as high as $5 trillion.

Thus, the release of TARP 2 is welcome news for the banking sector but the prospect of further month-to-month losses and feedback loops that are not yet priced in calls for a more comprehensive solution for toxic assets along the lines of the proposed 'aggregator bank' or preferably an outright restructuring of the banking system a la RTC. Moreover, in order to address the root causes of the financial crisis in the mortgage and the household sectors, we proposed recently the "HOME (Home Owners' Mortgage Enterprise): A 10 Step Plan to Resolve the Financial Crisis" that includes an RTC to deal with toxic assets, a HOLC to reduce homeowner mortgage debt, and an RFC to refinance viable banking institutions.

The US banking system is borderline insolvent in the aggregate and it will take a huge amount of public financial resources and complex and time-consuming work-out of insolvent institutions to restore its financial health and allow it to lend again in ways that support sustained economic growth.



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John F. Mauldin
johnmauldin@investorsinsight.com
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