Tuesday, November 29, 2011

gross

December 2011
​Family Feud
  • Investors should recognize that Euroland's problems are global and secular in nature; it will be years before Euroland and developed nations in total can constructively escape from their straitjacket of debt.
  • Global growth will likely remain stunted, interest rates artificially low and investors continually disenchanted with returns that fail to match expectations.
  • Investors should consider risk assets in emerging economies, such as Brazil and Asia, and bonds in the strongest developed economies, where the steep yield curve may offer opportunities for capital gains and potentially higher total returns.
A 12-year-old coffee mug has a permanent place on the right corner of my office desk. Given to me by an Allianz executive to commemorate PIMCO's marriage in 1999, it reads: "You can always tell a German but you can't tell him much."
 
It was hilarious then, but less so today given the events of the past several months, which have exposed a rather dysfunctional Euroland family. Still, my mug might now legitimately be joined by others that jointly bear the burden of dysfunctionality.
 
"Beware of Greeks bearing gifts" could be one; "Luck of the Irish" another; and how about a giant Italian five-letter "Scusi" to sum up the current predicament?
 
The fact is that Euroland's fingers are pointing in all directions, each member believing they have done more than their fair share to resolve a crisis that appears intractable and never-ending. The world is telling them to come together; they're telling each other the same; but as of now, it appears that you can't tell any of them very much.
 
The investment message to be taken from this policy foodfight is that sovereign credit is a legitimate risk spread from now until the "twelfth of never."
 
Standard & Poor's shocked the world in August with its downgrade of the U.S. – one of the world's cleanest dirty shirts – to double A plus. But what was once an emerging market phenomenon has long since infected developed economies as post-Lehman deleveraging and disappointing growth exposed balance sheet excesses of prior decades.
 
Portugal, Ireland, Iceland and Greece hit the headlines first, but "new normal" growth that was structurally as opposed to cyclically dominated exposed gaping holes in previously sacrosanct sovereign credits.
What has become obvious in the last few years is that debt-driven growth is a flawed business model when financial markets and society no longer have an appetite for it. In addition to initial conditions of debt to gross domestic product and related metrics, the ability of a sovereign to snatch more than its fair share of growth from an anorexic global economy has become the defining condition of creditworthiness – and very few nations are equal to the challenge.
 
It was in this "growth snatching" that the dysfunctional Euroland family was especially vulnerable. Work ethic and hourly working weeks aside, the Euroland clan has long been confined to the same monetary house. One rate, one policy fits all, whereas serial debt offenders such as the U.S., U.K. and numerous G-20 others have had the ability to print and "grow" their way out of it.
 
Beggar thy neighbor if necessary was the weapon of choice in the Depression, and it has conveniently kept highly indebted non-Euroland sovereigns with independent central banks afloat during the past few years as well. Depressed growth with more inflation, perhaps, but better than the alternative straitjacket in Euroland. As currently structured, Euroland's worst offenders now find themselves at the feet of a Germanic European Central Bank that cannot be told to go all-in and to print as much and as quickly as America and its lookalikes.

Proposals from the German/French axis in the last few days have heartened risk markets under the assumption that fiscal union anchored by a smaller number of less debt-laden core countries will finally allow the ECB to cap yields in Italy and Spain and encourage private investors to once again reengage Euroland bond markets. To do so, the ECB would have to affirm its intent via language or stepped up daily purchases of peripheral debt on the order of five billion Euros or more. The next few days or weeks will shed more light on the possibility, but bondholders have imposed a "no trust zone" on policymaker flyovers recently. Any plan that involves an "all-in" commitment from the ECB will require a strong hand indeed.

On the fiscal side the EU's solution has been to "clean up your act," throw out the scoundrels and scofflaws (eight governments have fallen) and balance your budgets. Such a process, however, almost necessarily involves several years of recessionary growth and deflationary wage pressures on labor markets in the offending countries. While the freshly proposed 20-30% insurance scheme of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) offers hope for the refunding of maturing debt, it is the deflationary, growth-stifling, labor/wage destroying aspect of the EU's original currency construction that threatens a positive outcome over the long term. Without an ability to devalue their currency vs. global competitors or even – "Gott im Himmel" – Germany itself, peripheral countries may have survival to look forward to, but little else. Perhaps the Italians and Spaniards will put up with it, but maybe they won't. The ultimate vote of the working men and women in these countries will always hang over the markets like a Damocles sword or perhaps a French/German guillotine. If the axe falls, then bond defaults may follow no matter what current policies may promise in the short term.
 
Investors and investment markets will likely be supported or even heartened by recent days' policy proposals. The problem of Euroland is twofold however. First of all, they will remain a dysfunctional family no matter what the outcome. You can't tell a German much, and while they can issue what appear to be constructive orders and solutions to the southern peripherals, there is little doubt that none of them will "like it very much." Slow/negative growth and historically wide bond yield spreads will therefore likely continue. Globalized markets themselves will remain relatively dysfunctional, pointing towards high cash balances in presumably safe haven countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. The U.S. dollar should stay relatively strong, ultimately affecting its own anemic growth rate in a downward direction.
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly however, investors should recognize that Euroland's problems are global and secular in nature, reflecting worldwide delevering and growth dynamics that began in 2008. It will be years before Euroland, the United States, Japan and developed nations in total can constructively escape from their straitjacket of high debt and low growth. If so, then global growth will remain stunted, interest rates artificially low and the investor class continually disenchanted with returns that fail to match expectations. If you can get long-term returns of 5% from either stocks or bonds, you should consider yourself or your portfolio in the upper echelon of competitors.
 
To approach those numbers, risk assets in developing as opposed to developed economies should be emphasized. Consider Brazil with its agricultural breadbasket and its oil. Consider Asia with its underdeveloped consumer sector but be mindful of credit bubbles. In bond market space, the favorite strategy will be to locate the cleanest dirty shirts – the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and Australia at the moment – and focus on a consistent, "extended period of time" policy rate that allows two- to ten-year maturities to roll down a near perpetually steep yield curve to produce capital gains and total returns which exceed stingy, financially repressive coupons. A 1% five-year Treasury yield, for instance, produces a 2% return when held for 12 months under such conditions. Bond investors should also consider high as opposed to lower quality corporates as economic growth slows in 2012.
 
Because of Euroland's family feud, because of too much global debt, because of deflationary policy solutions that are in some cases too little, in some cases ill conceived, and in many cases too late, financial markets will remain low returning and frequently frightening for months/years to come. I can imagine the coffee mugs for 2020 now: "Gesundheit!" from the Germans, "C'est la vie," from the French and "Stiff Upper Lip," from the British. In the United States I suppose it'll still say, "Let's go shopping," although our wallets will be skinnier. You can always tell an American, you know, but you can't tell 'em to stop shopping. Likewise, investors should always be able to tell a delevering, growth constrictive global economy – but perhaps not. Dysfunction is not exclusive to politicians. Families, it seems, feud everywhere.
 
Note: Initial paragraphs were originally published in Financial Times Markets Insight on November 15, 2011
(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cc1ada48-0c4d-11e1-8ac6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1f1q48ixJ)

malde

It's All Very Taxing
John Mauldin | November 29, 2011

Today's Outside the Box is something a little different for me. Howard Marks of Oaktree Capital Management has produced a most excellent summary of the problems inherent in "all things taxing" in the US. He delves into not only the specifics but also some of the philosophy of taxation. This is a balanced piece in which he tries to present all sides and arguments, giving us a very real picture of the dilemma we face, and leaving us to draw our own conclusions. Whatever we do going forward, including nothing, the outcome with regard to taxes is going to be difficult if not painful for most of us. We talk about everyone paying their fair share, but what does that mean? The answer is that it means very different things to different people.

This goes hand in hand with my contention that we face very difficult choices, and none of them are pain-free. I have my preferred methods and choices, and you have yours, and your neighbors have yet more divergent views. But we must make the tough decisions, or the market is going to treat us as roughly as it is Italian debt. If we let it get to that point, the choices will be even more limited and painful.

This is a longer than usual OTB but it is very good, and I suggest you send it on to others, as it provides a framework for discussion and understanding the positions that others in our society might take – people of good will but with different understandings of how the world works and what is "fair." Often, their views will not be based on the same rationale as yours or mine, and thus they will come to different conclusions. But soon we will all make some very important decisions (at the polls) about who will make those decisions for us. Let's choose wisely.

Right now, I am going to choose to hit the send button and go along with my daughter Tiffani to dinner with Art Cashin, Rich Yamarone, and Barry Ritholtz, and see what wisdom they may impart. With Art, you can always count on learning something, and on hearing some wonderful stories. I am sure we will also debate the end of the euro, among other pleasant dinner topics. I live for such moments. I will report back.

Your enjoying a beautiful day in New York City analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
JohnMauldin@2000wave.com

It's All Very Taxing

By Howard Marks
November 16, 2011

The issue is simple: the U.S. government generally spends more than it brings in . . . and recently, a lot more. For years Congress was willing to serially raise the federal debt ceiling and monetize the deficit. But this past summer, some legislators balked. When the early August deadline for an increase in the ceiling arrived, our elected officials kicked the can down the road, but less far than usual. They created a Congressional supercommittee with unprecedented power to propose solutions, and they designed automatic spending cuts in case no proposal won approval.

With the committee working under a November 23 deadline to find ways to reduce the federal deficit by $1 trillion-plus over the next decade, and with a presidential election less than a year away, the subject of taxes is all over the headlines and likely to remain there. Thus I've decided to provide a background piece on the issues.

What form will the deficit-cutting action take? In fact, the possibilities fall into only four categories:

• cut discretionary spending,
• reduce expenditures on entitlements,
• cut waste and fraud, or
• increase tax revenues.

Given the magnitude of the problem, the limited number of potential solutions, and the differences between the parties on the subject, there's already debate regarding the fourth of those listed above. Democrats generally feel tax increases should be part of any solution, and Republicans often insist that while they're open to overhauling the tax code, total taxes must not rise.

What's Fair is Fair

This memo got its start as an excuse for me to write about one of my greatest pet peeves: the so-called "fair share."

Ask your typical Democrat or liberal about the idea of increasing taxes on upper-bracket earners, and what will they say? In my experience, the answer's always the same: "We're not out to soak the rich. We just want them to pay their fair share." We've seen it over and over for years. For example:

"Were [the politicians levying taxes on Americans] seeking to redistribute wealth, to recast society along more egalitarian lines? Or were they simply trying to ensure that rich people paid their "fair share"? The answer, predictably, is both. . . .

"If poor and middle class Americans were going to be asked [by President Roosevelt], of necessity, to shoulder much of the fiscal burden, then they needed assurance the rich were paying their share. . . .

"No one made the case more succinctly than Rep. Cordell Hull, legislative father of the 1913 income tax. 'I have no disposition to tax wealth unnecessarily or unjustly,' he explained in his memoirs. 'But I do believe that the wealth of the country should bear its just share of the burden of taxation and that it should not be permitted to shirk that duty.' "

("Soaking the Wealthy: An American Tradition" The Wall Street Journal, January 29-30, 2011)

The rhetoric remained unchanged in the late twentieth century:

" 'We will lower the tax burden on middle class Americans,' [Bill Clinton] pledged in 1992, 'by asking the very wealthy to pay their fair share.' " ("The Middle-Class Tax Trap" The New York Times, April 17, 2011)

More recently, President Obama carried on the tradition.

"I will veto any bill that changes benefits for those who rely on Medicare but does not raise serious revenues by asking the wealthiest Americans or biggest corporations to pay their fair share." (The New York Times, September 20, 2011)

And here's another reference from just a month ago:

"In proposing a 5 percent surtax on incomes of more than $1 million a year to pay for job-creation measures sought by President Obama, Senate Democratic leaders on Wednesday escalated efforts to strike a more populist tone and to draw Republicans into a confrontation over how much affluent Americans should pay to help others cope with a struggling economy. . . .

" 'It's interesting to note that independents, Democrats and Republicans and even the Tea Party agree it's time for millionaires and billionaires to pay their fair share of taxes,' [Senate Majority Leader] Reid said Wednesday."

(The New York Times, October 6, 2011)

But what is the fair share? How is it to be determined, and by whom? When Senator Reid says, "it's time for millionaires and billionaires to pay their fair share," he implies they haven't been doing so thus far. How does he know? What's the standard? If there's an objective standard for one's fair share, why does it only seem to be those from the left side of the political spectrum who say it's not being paid? And if there isn't an objective standard, how can the fair share be determined? The truth is, fairness is almost entirely in the eye of the beholder, and "get them to pay their fair share" seems like just another way to say "raise their taxes."

There's probably only one element of fairness that's beyond discussion: those with higher incomes should pay more in taxes. After that, everything is up for grabs.

• For example, we have a progressive system of taxation, meaning that higher earners don't merely pay more in terms of dollars; they generally pay a higher percentage of their incomes in taxes. Most people agree that this is fair. But is it? Why should success be penalized through greater taxation? And if the tax rate for those who earn more should be higher, how much higher? Should the top marginal tax rate be double that applicable to lower-income taxpayers? Triple? What's fair?

• Are some forms of income more desirable to society and thus deserving of taxation at lower rates?
• And should we encourage certain expenditures by making them deductible from taxable income?

The fairness of all of these things is subject to discussion and disagreement. They come under the heading of tax policy.

Is Taxation Progressive? Progressive Enough?

Under the U.S. system, people in higher income brackets pay tax at higher rates. (However, Mark Twain said, "All generalizations, including this one, are false." For an exception to the generalization above, see the discussion of the "Buffett Rule" on page 5.) In large part, the question of fairness primarily surrounds whether the higher rates are high enough.

Talk about "the eye of the beholder." There's evidence on both sides of this debate:

• The top 1% of U.S. taxpayers pay 38% of all individual federal taxes. The top 10% pay 70% of all taxes, the top 25% pay 86%, and the top 50% pay 97%.
• That leaves the bottom 50% of all taxpayers paying only 3% of the total.
• About half of Americans pay no federal income tax, and almost 25% pay no federal taxes at all.
• The average federal income tax rate for the top 1% of Americans is 23% (and for the top half it's 14%), while the average rate for the bottom half is 3%.

Notwithstanding the rhetoric, there's no doubt about the fact that America's top earners are taxed more heavily than the rest. On the other hand, they pay at lower rates than they used to (when I was a boy the top marginal rate was 94%), and it seems progressivity has declined.

". . . the effective federal tax rate, including payroll taxes, for the wealthiest 0.01 percent of earners fell to 31.5 percent in 2005, from 42.9 percent in 1979 [for a decline of 26.6%], according to data from the Congressional Budget Office. Over the same time, effective rates for taxpayers in the center of the range fell to 14.2 percent, a decrease of just 4 percentage points [or 22.0%]." (The New York Times, September 21, 2011)

Total revenues from income taxes have declined in the U.S. – they "are at a historical low of 15.3 per cent of the gross domestic product, compared with a postwar average of 18.5 per cent" (Financial Times, September 25) – and they've declined more for top earners than for the rest. This is because of both specific rate cuts that have been enacted and the fact that the rates applied to dividends and capital gains – which clearly flow more to people in the upper income brackets – have declined relative to the rates on salaries and wages.

On average, higher earners absolutely do pay a higher percentage than those who earn less. But the decision as to whether the differential is just right, too little or too great is highly subjective and certainly a valid topic for debate.

Righteous Income

In the U.S., different types of income are taxed at different rates, suggesting some are considered more virtuous than others. For example, profits on investment assets held for more than a year, so-called "long-term capital gains," are taxed less than "ordinary income" such as salaries and interest. This has been the case for so long that we consider it the norm, and what we're used to often becomes the baseline for "fairness."

Long-term capital gains are taxed at reduced rates because of a judgment that long-term investment in things like securities, companies and real estate is beneficial for the economy and should be encouraged. Right now, the top tax rate on long-term investment profit is less than half that on short-term gains and ordinary income. And in recent years, the taxes on dividends have been reduced to similar levels, in part to mitigate double taxation of corporate profits but also because of a judgment that the equity investments that give rise to dividends are good for our society.

Is it appropriate to tax profits on long-term investments at rates below those on other forms of income? Certainly we should encourage investment, but there's no consensus that the tax code is the place to do it. Some foreign jurisdictions don't tax capital gains at all, while others tax them at the same rate as all other income.

What about interest? Why are dividends taxed at preferential rates and interest at ordinary rates? The explanation may lie in the fact that interest is deductible for corporations, while dividends aren't. Interest is paid out of pretax income, while in theory dividends are paid out of after-tax income – although the existence of corporate deductions and credits means dividends may, in fact, be paid out of income that hasn't been taxed by the U.S. Alternatively, the difference in tax treatment may be the result of a desire to encourage investment in "risky" equities rather than "safe" debt. But some companies' dividends are no doubt safer than some other companies' interest payments, so this distinction is questionable. If the goal is to encourage risk bearing, is dividend versus interest the right criterion?

While on the subject of gains from investments, it's interesting to note that, not long ago, dividends were included with interest under the rubric "unearned income." This pejorative phrase implied that income on capital, not requiring labor, was less virtuous than that stemming from labor, so-called "earned income." Thus unearned income – primarily dividends and interest – was taxed more heavily than wages.

But now things have turned 180 degrees, and returns on capital are taxed at lower rates than wages. It's worth noting that the Democrats – commonly considered the party of labor – controlled the government for much of the period 1928 to 1980, when earned income was favored. On the other hand, the Republicans – the party of those with capital to invest – have been in control more of the time since 1980, and the taxation of returns on capital has declined in relative terms. The definition of virtuous income that should be encouraged through lower taxes clearly is subjective, impermanent and subject to change with the winds of politics.

One debate that has arisen recently surrounds the so-called "Buffett Rule." For the last few years, Warren Buffett has been speaking about the fact that he pays a smaller percentage of his income in taxes than does his secretary. Presumably this is because his income consists primarily of long-term capital gains and very little of salary, bonus and interest.

(As an aside, it should be noted that Buffett's lower tax rate, while not unique, is far from the norm. According to The New York Times of September 24, "The number of people who fall under the Buffett Rule is quite small, only 60,000" out of 450,000 taxpayers who make over $1 million. "And the amount of revenue that would be generated [by the Buffett Rule] over the next 10 years is equally small – just $13 billion. . . .")

Buffett's tax status is a function of policy choices made by the people who wrote our tax laws. According to The New York Times of September 21, "President Obama's proposal for a new tax on millionaires . . . would counteract decades of tax reductions for most Americans that have given the wealthy the most benefit. . . ." Do we consider these decisions appropriate in principle and Buffett's just an extreme case? Or do we want to change things so returns on capital are less favored and big earners can never pay overall taxes at lower rates than those who earn less? (And, as an aside, are all long-term profits truly beneficial to society? How, for instance, does society benefit when someone buys a bar of gold?)

Deductions, Loopholes and Tax Incentives

Speaking of gold, in "All That Glitters" on that subject, I quoted from a speech by Mississippi state legislator "Soggy" Sweat that showed his ability to simultaneously praise and condemn whiskey with equal conviction. Outdoing Soggy, depending on who's talking, Washington politicos use the three very different terms above to describe the same thing: offsets to taxable income.

The drafters called them deductions: provisions that reduce the net income on which taxes are levied. Critics call them loopholes, suggesting there's something underhanded about those provisions. And politicians use the laudatory-sounding term tax incentives to describe tax code provisions that reduce tax revenues in order to encourage certain behavior. It all depends on your point of view.

Let's take a look at one of the most popular deductions: interest on mortgages. For as long as I can remember, interest on home mortgages has been treated as a desirable expenditure that should be encouraged. Because home ownership is considered part of the American dream, the tax code subsidizes it by reducing the after-tax cost for those who borrow to buy homes (and are able to itemize rather than take the standard deduction). While everything else may be arguable, certainly this seems fair. But is it?

• Are homeowners more virtuous than renters? If mortgage interest is deductible but rent isn't, we're requiring renters to subsidize owners. Is that appropriate?
• On average, homeowners are from the middle and upper income brackets. Is it fair that poorer renters provide a benefit for richer owners?
• And is it desirable that those able to buy more expensive homes should get more of a subsidy than those consigned to cheaper ones?

As with the taxation of dividends, judgments on these matters change over time. Until 1987, there was no limit on the amount of mortgage interest that could be deducted. If you could afford to own ten homes with multiple million-dollar mortgages on each one, taxpayers would collectively share the cost by reducing your income taxes due. Today interest is deductible on only a maximum of $1.1 million of debt, and only on first and second mortgages, and only on a primary residence and a second home. So the tax treatment of owners of many homes and more expensive homes has become less generous. But it's still better than that of renters. Is that proper?

What about the tax deductibility of charitable donations? As I travel the world visiting with clients, I see that two things about the U.S. are quite uncommon: (a) Americans give a lot of money to charity and (b) donations to charity are deductible in calculating taxable income. Everyone tells me the latter is the main reason for the former. In particular, these things are part of the explanation for the existence of the many private, non-state-supported colleges and universities in the U.S., the best of which are so good at least in part because of their significant donor-provided endowments. For example, Harvard and Yale are only half as old as England's Oxford and Cambridge, but they benefit from endowments that are far larger.

Part of this is true because legislators decided at some point to subsidize non-profits by encouraging contributions through the tax code. That's certainly understandable. And yet, changes were made in recent years to limit upper-bracket taxpayers' use of deductions in order to ensure that they pay some minimum tax rate.

What about the unevenness of the subsidy? The cost of giving $1 to charity is reduced by the amount of taxes it saves the donor, which is equal to $1 times the person's tax rate. So today, speaking simplistically, it costs a top-bracket taxpayer 65 cents to give a dollar to charity, while it costs a bottom-bracket taxpayer 85 cents. Is that fair? Should the bigger earner receive a greater reward for a dollar of philanthropy than someone who can afford it less easily? And should those who aren't inclined to give to charity be required to subsidize those who are?

Finally, what about state and local taxes, the third of the significant deductions? Here tax deductibility isn't due to a decision to encourage people to pay non-federal taxes, but rather to cushion the effect of being taxed in multiple jurisdictions. Texas, Florida and five other states have no personal income tax, California has a heavy one, and someone living in Manhattan pays tax to both New York State and New York City. Deductibility on the federal tax return somewhat evens out the burden and ensures that (a) the states get first crack at taxing income and (b) the federal government can only tax what's left, in line with federalist principles.

This raises a number of questions. Is the deductibility of state and local taxes fair? As with other deductions, the key question is "fair to whom?" Some people pay more state and local taxes than others, meaning they get greater deductions than others. As a result, while a person with a given income who lives in a high-tax state pays higher total taxes, he or she pays less federal tax than someone in a low-tax state. Is that fair?

Further, what all of this means is that by providing more benefits to its residents (or at least spending more money, whether beneficially or not), a high-tax state creates a deduction for its residents and thus reduces the federal government's total tax take. Is this right? Should the federal government subsidize spending on the part of high-tax states? That is, should residents in low-tax states bear part of the expenses of high-tax states? There's nothing simple about these matters.

While the source of an exemption rather than a deduction, what about interest on "municipal bonds" issued by states, counties, cities and local agencies. This is exempt from federal taxation, under the legal doctrine that the federal government mustn't tax the operations of the states. ("The power to tax is the power to destroy," one of our great Supreme Court decisions held.) But here again, we're talking about a federal benefit (in the form of a lower cost of capital) for the biggest-spending local governments and their citizens, and a tax break for people who lend to them.

And what about property taxes? These are deductible without limitation. Thus the owner of a mansion – or ten mansions – receives more of a tax benefit than a low-income earner. And it's another subsidy for homeowners versus renters. Is this right, or should it be changed?

To date, it has been deemed fair for state and local income tax to be deductible on federal tax returns. But is this immutable? Sales tax used to be deductible, too (meaning the buyer of a Rolls Royce got assistance from the federal government). Now it's not. More fair?

What if the deduction for state and local taxes and the exemption for muni interest were ended? This would increase the cost of financing for state and local governments and most impact the highest-spending states, potentially requiring higher taxes causing people to move away. This would reduce those states' revenues and require them to raise taxes further (and drive away still more taxpayers) in a painful cycle. And are those states profligate or just burdened (like California by a substantial low-income population) or natural-resource-poor (lacking Texas's oil)?

So even in "small" matters like the tax deductibility of mortgage interest, charitable donations, and state and local taxes, there are lots of difficult questions. While on their face the deductions seem fair to homeowners, philanthropists and residents of high-tax states, they're simultaneously penalizing renters, non-donors and residents of low-tax states (as well as taxpayers in low tax brackets and those without enough deductions to itemize).

How about the biggest exclusions of all: employer-provided health care and the deferral of taxation of contributions to pension plans? In both cases, those receiving these employer-paid benefits enjoy a substantial benefit not shared by those not fortunate enough to participate. For instance, is it fair that many better-paid workers get thousands of dollars a year in untaxed health-care benefits, while other workers enjoy no such subsidy?

Fairness turns out to be quite an elusive concept.

Reasons for Increasing Taxes

As U.S. leaders wrestle to reduce the budget deficit in the coming months and years, spending cuts are a certainty. But the question of whether taxes should be increased is sure to be hotly debated. A number of justifications for doing so are advanced:

• Some people want wealth to be redistributed throughout society by taxing the rich and giving to the poor. They want the government to do more for those who are less fortunate (or less able), and that means having the rest pay for it.
• There's an argument that for the deficit solution to be equitable, all citizens should contribute to it. Though some government spending benefits all citizens alike, such as national defense, national parks and the administration of justice, much spending disproportionately benefits lower earners, in the form of public education and transportation (which are supported by the federal government), unemployment insurance, food stamps, Medicare and Medicaid, etc. Thus the effect of the coming spending cuts will fall more heavily on the poor. Some argue that since they receive less in benefits and are therefore less likely to experience their loss, the wealthy should share the burden of reducing the deficit through increased tax payments.
• As opposed to the ideological arguments reviewed above, tax increases are among the limited number of possible contributors to deficit reduction listed on page 1. Thus, in the simplest terms, we can cut more from the deficit if we tax more (all else being equal).
• The ultimate practical point is that spending cuts alone won't do much to eliminate the deficit.
• Viewed another way, promises of entitlements have been in place for decades, people have relied on them, and those promises have to be kept. This is clearly impossible without increased taxes and/or exploding deficits.

Is redistribution a valid goal? To some people, it is part of the process of helping every citizen in the "pursuit of happiness." To others, it's akin to socialism and contrary to the American ethic in which rewards follow ability and hard work.

Should everyone contribute to deficit reduction, including bigger earners through the biggest tax increases? Or should the savings come primarily through sacrifices on the part of those who to date have been the primary beneficiaries of excessive government spending? I have no doubt that we'll see fireworks on these topics.

Reasons for Not Increasing Taxes (or for Lowering Them)

Before concluding that the above points are persuasive, you should consider the equally numerous arguments to the contrary.

• Many believe our massive deficit stems from a government (and an entrenched army of government employees) willing and able to spend all available cash (and more). A bureaucracy will always find uses – many of them wasteful – for available revenues. Thus the only solution is to "starve the beast": only tax cuts and restraints on borrowing will force the government to limit spending.
• It is argued that by decreasing the after-tax proceeds from a dollar earned, tax increases reduce people's incentive to work, and thus cut into a nation's overall productivity. From 1974 to 1979, Britain's top marginal rate was 83% (although with a 15% surcharge on interest and dividends, it could rise to 98%). I remember reading about a banker who took time off without pay to paint his house. Society benefits when each of us does the things we're best at. But if a banker who earns $20,000 a month only gets to keep $3,400, he's better off forgoing a month's salary to avoid paying a painter who gets $5,000 a month.
• Research into the "elasticity of taxable income" (ETI) shows that "when marginal tax rates go up, the amount of reported incomes goes down," suggesting higher taxes do reduce productivity. (The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2010). Of course, it's also possible that when rates go up, the incentives for failing to report income also go up. Thus part of the ETI effect could come from under-reporting, as opposed to reduced effort.
• Taking the above a step further, the "Laffer curve," named after economist and presidential adviser Arthur Laffer, posits that by discouraging work (and thus reducing incomes), raising income tax rates actually reduces income tax collections. Thus, by increasing taxable income, rate reductions bring revenue gains.
• Last but especially timely is the classic Keynesian argument that raising taxes and thus reducing after-tax incomes shouldn't be done at a time when the economy is weak and spending should be encouraged, not inhibited.

For me the bottom line – the real reason why many people don't want rates to go up – is that they don't want to pay more taxes. I think people tend to "vote their pocketbooks," meaning many people with incomes to tax will vote for the candidate who promises lower taxes. But the economic theories discussed above certainly lend validity and even nobility to the pursuit of higher after-tax income . . . and the fact that their supporters are self-interested doesn't make them wrong. Finally, for whichever reason, a good portion of the electorate buys these arguments. And The New York Times reported on November 2 that "Americans for Tax Reform, a taxpayer advocacy group . . . says that 41 senators and more than 235 House members have pledged in writing to oppose all tax increases."

Topics in the News – Income Inequality

One of the outstanding characteristics of the U.S. economy at this time is the rising dispersion between incomes. The percentage of total income going to higher earners has been increasing dramatically, whether because of (a) the rising importance of education and technological literacy or (b) the movement of work offshore, the declining availability of blue-collar jobs and the reduced power of private-sector unions to garner wage gains. And given the pattern of tax cuts and the special treatment given to income on capital, the tax system has magnified the divergence.

A recent report from the Congressional Budget Office provided dramatic evidence of the divergent trends in income. It outlined the percentage gain in average inflation-adjusted after-tax income of various income groups between 1979 and 2007:

• Top 1% of the population in terms of income: 275%
• Next 19%: 65%
• Middle 60%: 40%
• Bottom 20%: 18%

According to the CBO:

• The share of income going to higher-income households rose, while the share going to lower-income households fell.
• The top fifth of the population saw a 10-percentage-point increase in their share of after-tax income.
• Most of that growth went to the top 1 percent of the population.
• All other [quintile] groups saw their shares decline by 2 to 3 percentage points.

An October 26 article in The New York Times reported the following conclusions:

". . . the report said government policy has become less redistributive since the late 1970s, doing less to reduce the concentration of income.

" 'The equalizing effect of federal taxes was smaller' in 2007 than in 1979, as 'the composition of federal revenues shifted away from progressive income taxes to less-progressive payroll taxes,' the budget office said.

"Also, it said, federal benefit payments are doing less to even out the distribution of income, as a growing share of benefits, like Social Security, goes to older Americans, regardless of their income. . . .

"Also cited as factors contributing to the rapid growth of income at the top [in addition to federal tax and spending policies] were the structure of executive compensation; high salaries for some 'superstars' in sports and the arts; the increasing size of the financial services industry; and the growing role of capital gains, which go disproportionately to higher- income households."

The implications for tax discussions are obvious. Upper earners have moved further ahead relative to lower earners, and tax policies have contributed to this trend. For those who think progressivity should be bolstered, income should be redistributed, and those most able to pay should contribute more heavily to solving the deficit problem, upper-bracket earners make a most attractive target.

Topics in the News – The Sputtering Economy

In early 2011, there was a growing consensus that the U.S. economy was on an upward trajectory – that recovery had taken hold. Reported growth in GDP was accelerating. Orders, sales and profits were strong. Cash was piling up in corporate coffers. The Fed gave increased thought to increasing interest rates to cool off the economy and prevent the rekindling of inflation.

But in the summer it was reported that the economy had cooled, and earlier estimates of GDP were revised downward. A possible double-dip recession became the topic of the day. At the same time, an unseemly political confrontation regarding the U.S. federal debt ceiling exposed a flawed, unconstructive political system at work; produced a downgrade of long-term Treasury debt on the part of Standard & Poor's; seemed to take us to the brink of a default; and sapped confidence at all levels.

Despite the economy's weakness, further government aid for the economy has been rendered untenable by widespread negative feelings about the stimulus programs of 2007-08 and the popular view that the government took care of Wall Street but not Main Street, combined with the nearness of the next presidential election. Especially with stimulus unlikely, government actions that discourage growth should be viewed skeptically.

In the U.S. – just like in Greece and elsewhere in Europe – the answer to problems of excessive deficit and debt can be summed up in one word: austerity. Everyone's after debtor nations to practice austerity; that is, to spend less and tax more. The problem is that such behavior will reduce citizens' incomes, discourage consumer spending and slow or reverse economic growth. While on paper austerity will cut deficits, it may actually add to them by reducing government tax collections. In this way, it would necessitate further borrowing.

There's no doubt that, along with spending cuts, tax increases would have a detrimental impact on the prospects for economic recovery. Thus even people who are open to tax increases may not want them to be effective until the economy is out of danger. As the Financial Times put it on October 29, "Many households are so badly overleveraged that a balanced federal budget would ruin them."

But our economic problems aren't just cyclical. There are worrisome secular trends, many surrounding the scarcity of new jobs, the movement of manufacturing overseas, and the low level of business investment in the U.S. The best cure for our cyclical and secular difficulties would be growth based on industrial expansion. This would put people to work, support increases in spending, reinvigorate the housing sector, increase tax revenues and shrink the deficit. But for this to happen, we need (a) tax rates that allow successful entrepreneurs to retain a substantial percentage of the resulting profits and (b) confidence that the tax system won't be made more confiscatory after they've made their investments. At the present time, the latter, in particular, is very much lacking.

Topics in the News – Flat Tax

It's interesting to note that writers of tax law have two main routes to a given revenue total: low rates without deductions, exemptions and credits, or high rates with them. To date they have chosen the latter course. An article in The Wall Street Journal of January 29, 2011 marked down this choice to pure politics:

"Why did [Roosevelt's high tax rates] last so long . . . beginning their long steady decline only during the Kennedy administration? . . . In part to fund the Korean conflict and the Cold War, but also to grease the skids of modern politics. Lawmakers were able to blunt the effect of high statutory rates by handing out tax preferences to their friends, constituents and contributors. Steep rates preserved the appearance of progressivity (and, to be fair, some of the reality), while supplying politicians with their stock in trade: favors."

There are periodic calls for lower "flat" income tax rates and the elimination of deductions and other wrinkles, and we are hearing them today. The main goal is tax simplification. I commend this. (I have to admit that I, with my MBA in accounting, stopped being able to understand my own tax return decades ago.) But of course we cannot convert to a flat tax system without altering people's relative taxes. A change would require sweeping policy decisions.

Flat tax proposals are often accompanied by calls for a national sales, consumption or "value added" tax on spending, such as many other nations have. The problem here is that those with low incomes spend most or all of their earnings on life's necessities, and as incomes rise, people gain the possibility of spending less of their incomes and saving more. Thus sales taxes tend to take a higher percentage of income the lower one's income. That's why, in contrast with progressivity, sales taxes are described as "regressive."

Last month, Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain announced his "9-9-9 plan," which features a flat 9% income tax rate, 9% national sales tax and 9% business tax. Let's take a look at it. The Tax Policy Center is a non-partisan joint venture of the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. The St. Petersburg Times's politifact.com summarized the results of the TPC's analysis as follows: "83.8 percent of tax filers would get a tax increase . . . compared with current tax policy. On the other hand, most of the tax filers who make more than $1 million would get a tax cut . . . about 95.4 percent of this high income group."

Would it be right to make poor people pay income tax at the same rate as rich people and pay a higher percentage of their incomes in a national sales tax? Anything's fair game, I guess, but if the TPC's analysis is correct, this plan would represent a step away from progressivity and further skew after-tax income toward the wealthy. Yet we're likely to hear a lot more about flat tax during the coming campaign. When confronted with complex problems, people often welcome simple solutions.

Topics in the News – Political Posturing

A Democratic politician I know decided not to run for president in 2008 because he expected a rising tide of populist rhetoric to be required. He was right: classist speech rose substantially. And the rise continues unabated.

Democrats tend to lean toward bigger entitlement programs, greater governmental involvement in the economy, deficit spending, progressive taxation and income redistribution. These things are in contrast to Republicans' averred traditions of small government, individual self-sufficiency, free markets, balanced budgets and tax reduction. At the present time, with the economy performing poorly, Democrats are glad to describe Republicans' laissez faire policies as having contributed to joblessness and economic hardship. With difficulty more prevalent than prosperity today, populism – appealing to disadvantaged economic classes based on claimed inequities – represents a compelling brand of politics.

Thus in recent months we've increasingly heard Democratic politicians sneer at "millionaires and billionaires" (see Senator Reid on page 2), an epithet aimed at a group that's supposedly been getting away with something. (In the past, I seem to recall, it was instead a group most people wanted to be part of.) To date, the preferred Republican label for people with money has been "job creators," although this line of defense may be tough to maintain in the current climate.

The Financial Times of October 29 carried an article headlined "Obama takes high-risk stance against the rich." It described a decision to emulate Roosevelt's Depression-era rhetoric and point an accusing finger at the Republicans as the party of wealth.

"Throwing out the standard presidential playbook dictating an aspirational approach to centrist voters, the White House is cementing a message that strikes at wealth and privilege.

" 'There is surging sentiment among voters that the economy is weighted towards the wealthy,' said a senior White House official.

"The White House strategy will make the 2012 election a generational test of the Republican push of the last three decades for cutting taxes, in ways their critics say have been constantly skewed towards the highest earners."

However, the article goes on to say Republicans may respond in kind to this tactic, joining in support of the common man rather than standing up for wealthier supporters:

". . . Republicans are tweaking their public message, with the hardline [H]ouse majority leader, Eric Cantor, recently acknowledging the need to address the rich-poor gap.

"Mitt Romney, the frontrunner in the race to challenge Barack Obama in 2012, has taken to saying that he is standing up for the 'middle class' because the rich 'can look after themselves.' "

With candidates in both parties competing to sound less pro-wealth, top earners and their supportive tax policies should expect to be rhetorical targets in the coming election. Whether this will extend to Republican candidates dropping their resistance to tax increases remains to be seen.

The Ultimate Worry: Tyranny of the Majority

The elements that contributed importantly to America's success included economic aspiration, upward mobility and a tax system that encouraged labor and risk-taking. In short, we all could get rich. As a result, both those with money and those hoping to make money were attracted to the idea of low taxes. This made tax reduction a very popular theme over the last few decades.

But when people without money start to believe they can't make money, there's little to keep them from taking it from those who have it. This represents a threat to our way of life.

As I've written before, I was very impressed when, as a young man, I heard an interesting explanation for America's economic progress relative to Great Britain: "When the worker in Britain sees the boss drive out of the factory in his Rolls Royce, he says 'I'd like to put a bomb under that car.' When the worker in America sees the boss drive out of the factory in his Cadillac, he says 'I'd like to have a car like that someday.' " This tale says a lot about how we achieved our success . . . and also about what we'd better retain if we want to keep it.

The truth is, in a democracy, the lower-earning majority is perfectly capable of voting to confiscate the wealth of the minority. A lot of people have written about this and associated threats to our system:

" 'If Sparta and Rome perished,' asked Rousseau in his Social Contract, 'how can any state hope to live forever? The Body Politick, like the body of a man, begins to die as soon as it is born; it contains the seeds of its own destruction.' " (Financial Times, October 29)

" 'When men get in the habit of helping themselves to the property of others,' warned the New York Times in 1909, 'they are not easily cured of it.' " (The Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2011)

"Some people regard private enterprise as a predatory tiger to be shot. Others look on it as a cow they can milk. Not enough people see it as a healthy horse, pulling a sturdy wagon." (Winston Churchill)

"As Margaret Thatcher famously said, the problem with socialism is that sooner or later 'you run out of other people's money.' " (New York Post, January 12, 2011)

The risk is exacerbated today by the fact (as noted earlier) that about half of all Americans pay no federal income tax. This makes me wonder whether our democracy can make good decisions about taxation when half the people are outside the system.

Obviously, it's tempting to many to increase taxes on the rich, seeing it as a harmless way to enhance the welfare of the many at a small cost to the few. But the damage to the U.S.'s success machinery could vastly outweigh the sums confiscated from those who are targeted. The "fair share" taken from upper bracket earners has to be kept as small as possible if the tax system is to benefit all of our society. The coming debate over tax increases will be very important in this regard.

There can be no easy solution. Social programs and tax policies have been put in place that will combine with demographic and income trends to create challenging conditions. "The Middle-Class Tax Trap" (The New York Times, April 17, 2011) outlined the consequences:

"[Consider] the 'current law baseline,' a Congressional Budget Office projection in which the Bush-era tax rates aren't renewed in 2012, the Alternative Minimum Tax (which is supposed to hit only the rich but increasingly bites into middle-class paychecks) isn't indexed for inflation, and Medicare payments to doctors are slashed 20%.

"With these changes, the deficit drops away in the next 10 years, and more important, it stays manageably low for the decades after that. . . .

"This is how the 'current law baseline' cuts the deficit: Thanks to inflation and bracket creep, its tax code generally subjects more and more Americans to rates that now fall only on the wealthy.

"Today, for instance, a family of four making the median income . . . pays 15% in federal taxes. By 2035, under the C.B.O. projection, payroll and income taxes would claim 25% of that family's income. The marginal tax rate on labor would rise from 29% to 38%. Federal tax revenue, which has averaged 18% of G.D.P. since World War II, would hit 23% by the 2030s and climb ever higher after that.

"Such unprecedented levels of taxation would throw up hurdles to entrepreneurship, family formation and upward mobility. . . .

"They could have ugly political consequences as well. Historically, the most successful welfare states (think Scandinavia) have depended on ethnic solidarity to sustain their tax-and-transfer programs. But the working-age America of the future will be far more diverse than the retired cohort it's laboring to support. Asking a population that's increasingly brown and beige to accept punishing tax rates while white seniors receive roughly $3 in benefits for every dollar they paid in (the projected ratio in the 2030s) promises to polarize the country along racial as well as generational lines.

"The Republican vision for entitlement reform, President Obama said last week, would lead to a "fundamentally different America" than the one we inhabit today. He's right: asking the elderly to pay more for their health care, as [Representative] Paul Ryan proposes to do, would transform the American social contract, and cause no small amount of pain.

"But what Obama doesn't acknowledge is that the alternative path could lead to a different country as well – a more stagnant and balkanized society, in which our promise to the elderly crowds out the fundamental promise of America itself." (Emphasis added)

Will we keep the promise of entitlement programs or cut them back? Given the prominence of entitlements in the U.S. budget, in large part it comes down to that.

Over the last 80 years, politicians in the U.S. created entitlement programs that we cannot afford. Likewise, to varying degrees citizens throughout the developed world have been given promises their governments can't keep. That a day of reckoning would arrive is not news – credible observers have warned of our current problems for decades – but few politicians have been willing to fall on the sword of unpopular solutions.

Whatever action is taken now, it will not be pain-free. The unpayable debts run up in the past will have to be dealt with. And as for the future, there are only three possibilities: the promises will have to be scaled back, the tax burden will have to grow, and/or the deficits will have to be permitted to increase. If nations are to limit deficits – and it seems they may be forced to – there is no alternative to the first two of these. This fundamental truth will constitute a major portion of the public debate in coming years.

Tax policy consists of deciding who to take from (and how much) and who to give it to. There are no easy answers. We should all throw our support behind the common good and not just our individual interests.

Copyright 2011 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved.

Saturday, November 26, 2011

mald

Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game
By John Mauldin | November 25, 2011

Angela Merkel is leading the call for a rule change, a rewiring of the basic treaty that binds the EU. But is it both too much and too late? The market action suggests that time is indeed running out, and so we'll look at the likely consequences. Then I glance over the other way and take notice of news out of China that may be of import. Plus a few links for your weekend listening "pleasure." There is lots to cover, so let's get started.

Changing the Rules

I have been writing for a very long time about the changes needed to the EU treaty if Europe is to survive. Specifically, last week I noted that Angela Merkel has made it clear that the independence of the ECB must not be compromised. This week Sarkozy and the new prime minister of Italy, Mario Monti, agreed to stop their public calls for such changes (at least until their own crises get even worse, would be my guess). And Merkel has called for a new, stronger union with strict control of budgets as the price for further German aid for those countries in crisis. In seeming response:

"The European Commission on November 23 proposed a new package including budget previews at EU level, the establishment of independent fiscal councils and growth forecasts, closer surveillance of bailout recipients and a consultation paper on Eurobonds. There is also a growing consensus among EU policy makers on the need for the adoption of fiscal rules in national legislation. However, it is far from clear whether EU countries would accept the implicit loss of sovereignty this would involve and agree to treaty changes enshrining legally enforceable fiscal oversight at EU level. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is willing to support a change in Germany's own constitution if the EU Treaty change to that effect is agreed first." ( www.roubini.com)

But this means a major treaty change that must be approved by all member countries. Note that Merkel wants the treaty change first, or at least the language, before she takes it to German voters, which will certainly be required, since what she is suggesting is not allowed by the present German constitution. Without the changes stated clearly and explicitly in advance, it is unlikely, as I read the polls, that German voters will go along. Merkel has made it clear that any proposed changes will be limited to fiscal issues and central control and not touch on the ECB's independence. She is adamant against eurozone bonds and putting the German balance sheet at risk (see more below).

But will the rest of Europe go along with what would be a major alterations of their own individual sovereignty and their ability to adjust their own budgets, no matter what? And agree to all this in time to deal with the current crisis? Such changes will be controversial, to say the least. And they would require, if I understand, the yes votes of all 27 European Union members, or at a minimum the 17 eurozone members.

That is problematical. Will even German voters give up their independence and listen to an EU commission tell them what they can and cannot do with their own budget? A budget that is in theory controlled by the rest of Europe? The answer depends on whom you listen to last, as the answers range all over the board.

When Even Germany Fails

Let's get back to the German balance sheet. This week the markets were greeted with a failed German bond offering. The German central bank had to step in and buy German bunds, at a recent-series-high rate. And while the "trade" has been to buy German bunds as a hedge, Germany is not precisely a model of balance and austerity, with high (above 4%) deficits and a rising debt-to-GDP ratio. And the market senses the contradictions here. When even German bond auctions fail, whither the rest of Europe?

As a quick aside, notice that German yields are not higher than those of UK debt at some points. The market is clearly signaling that the lack of a national central bank with a printing press is an issue. Go figure. But that is a story for another letter at another time.

Let's look at some recent headlines. Greek 2-year bonds are now at 116%. You read that right. "Bond yields on short-term Italian debt rose above 8 per cent on Friday as Rome was forced to pay euro-era-high interest rates in what analysts called an 'awful' auction. A peak of 8.13 per cent was reached on three-year bonds, according to Reuters data, as Italian debt traded deeper into territory associated with bail-outs of Greece, Portugal and Ireland in the past 18 months.

"Italy raised its targeted €10bn in an auction of two-year bonds and six-month bills but at sharply higher yields. 'Rates have skyrocketed. It's simply not sustainable in the long run,' said Marc Ostwald, strategist at Monument Securities in London.

"Investors demanded a yield of 7.81 per cent for the two-year bond, up from 4.63 per cent last month. The six-month bills saw yields of 6.50 per cent, up from 3.54 per cent. That was significantly higher than Greece paid for six-month money earlier this month when it issued bills at 4.89 per cent." (Reuters)

Spanish bond yields are slightly lower but not by much, with both countries paying more for short-term debt than Greece.

And no one is really talking about Belgium, which I have been pointing to for some time. Belgium debt yield on its ten-year bonds went to 5.85%. Notice the recent trend, in the chart below. It looks like Greece in the not-very-distant past. (Chart courtesy of Roubini.com and Reuters data)

European Inverted Yield Curves

Let's rewind the tape a little bit. Both the Spanish and Italian bond markets are close to or already in an "inverted" state. That is when lower-term bonds yield higher than longer-term bonds, which is not a natural occurrence. Typically, when that happens, the markets are sending a signal of something. (Charts below courtesy of my long-suffering Endgame co-author, Jonathan Tepper of Variant Perception, who lets me call him up late for data like this.)

Note that Greece (especially) and Portugal inverted when they began to enter a crisis. And shortly thereafter they went into freefall. Why did it happen so suddenly?

The short explanation is that once the market perceives there is risk, the debt in question has to collapse to the point where risk takers will step in. Do you remember two summers ago, when I related what I thought was a remarkable conversation with two French bond traders in a bistro in Paris after the markets had closed? Greece was all the news. It was all Greece, all the time. And I asked them what their favorite trade was (as I like to do with all traders). The surprising answer (to me) was they were buying short-term Greek bonds. They walked me through the logic. I forget the yields, but they were sky-high. They figured they had at least a year and maybe two before the bonds defaulted, plenty of time to get a lot of yield and exit. And there were hedges.

Italian and Spanish yields are approaching that "bang!" moment. The only thing stopping them is the threat of the ECB stepping in and buying in real size. Which Merkel is against. And the market is starting to believe her, hence the move in yields.

Time to Review the Bang! Moment

One of the most important sections of Endgame is in a chapter where I review (and compare with other research) the book This Time is Different by Ken Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, and include part of an interview I did with them. This chapter was one of real economic epiphanies for me. Their data confirms other research about how things seemingly bounce along, and then the end comes seemingly all at once. Which we'll term the bang! moment. Let's review a few paragraphs from the book, starting with quotes from the interview I did:

"KENNETH ROGOFF: It's external debt that you owe to foreigners that is particularly an issue. Where the private debt so often, especially for emerging markets, but it could well happen in Europe today, where a lot of the private debt ends up getting assumed by the government and you say, but the government doesn't guarantee private debts, well no they don't. We didn't guarantee all the financial debt either before it happened, yet we do see that. I remember when I was first working on the 1980' Latin Debt Crisis and piecing together the data there on what was happening to public debt and what was happening to private debt, and I said, gosh the private debt is just shrinking and shrinking, isn't that interesting. Then I found out that it was being "guaranteed" by the public sector, who were in fact assuming the debts to make it easier to default on."

Now from Endgame:

"If there is one common theme to the vast range of crises we consider in this book, it is that excessive debt accumulation, whether it be by the government, banks, corporations, or consumers, often poses greater systemic risks than it seems during a boom. Infusions of cash can make a government look like it is providing greater growth to its economy than it really is.

"Private sector borrowing binges can inflate housing and stock prices far beyond their long-run sustainable levels, and make banks seem more stable and profitable than they really are. Such large-scale debt buildups pose risks because they make an economy vulnerable to crises of confidence, particularly when debt is short-term and needs to be constantly refinanced. Debt-fueled booms all too often provide false affirmation of a government's policies, a financial institution's ability to make outsized profits, or a country's standard of living. Most of these booms end badly. Of course, debt instruments are crucial to all economies, ancient and modern, but balancing the risk and opportunities of debt is always a challenge, a challenge policy makers, investors, and ordinary citizens must never forget."

And the following is key. Read it twice (at least!):

"Perhaps more than anything else, failure to recognize the precariousness and fickleness of confidence—especially in cases in which large short-term debts need to be rolled over continuously—is the key factor that gives rise to the this-time-is-different syndrome. Highly indebted governments, banks, or corporations can seem to be merrily rolling along for an extended period, when bang!—confidence collapses, lenders disappear, and a crisis hits.

"Economic theory tells us that it is precisely the fickle nature of confidence, including its dependence on the public's expectation of future events, which makes it so difficult to predict the timing of debt crises. High debt levels lead, in many mathematical economics models, to "multiple equilibria" in which the debt level might be sustained —or might not be. Economists do not have a terribly good idea of what kinds of events shift confidence and of how to concretely assess confidence vulnerability. What one does see, again and again, in the history of financial crises is that when an accident is waiting to happen, it eventually does. When countries become too deeply indebted, they are headed for trouble. When debt-fueled asset price explosions seem too good to be true, they probably are. But the exact timing can be very difficult to guess, and a crisis that seems imminent can sometimes take years to ignite."

"How confident was the world in October of 2006? John was writing that there would be a recession, a subprime crisis, and a credit crisis in our future. He was on Larry Kudlow's show with Nouriel Roubini, and Larry and John Rutledge were giving him a hard time about his so-called 'doom and gloom.' 'If there is going to be a recession you should get out of the stock market,' was John's call. He was a tad early, as the market proceeded to go up another 20% over the next 8 months. And then the crash came."

But that's the point. There is no way to determine when the crisis comes.

As Reinhart and Rogoff wrote:

"Highly indebted governments, banks, or corporations can seem to be merrily rolling along for an extended period, when bang!—confidence collapses, lenders disappear, and a crisis hits."

Bang! is the right word. It is the nature of human beings to assume that the current trend will work itself out, that things can't really be that bad. The trend is your friend … until it ends. Look at the bond markets only a year and then just a few months before World War I. There was no sign of an impending war. Everyone "knew" that cooler heads would prevail.

We can look back now and see where we have made mistakes in the current crisis. We actually believed that this time was different, that we had better financial instruments, smarter regulators, and were so, well, modern. Times were different. We knew how to deal with leverage. Borrowing against your home was a good thing. Housing values would always go up. Etc.

Until they didn't, and then it was too late. What were we thinking? Of course, we were thinking in accordance with our oh-so-human natures. It is all so predictable, except for the exact moment when the crisis hits. (And during the run-up we get all those wonderful quotes from market actors, which then come back to haunt them.)

If it was just Europe and if the crisis could be contained there, then maybe we could focus on something else for a change. But Europe as a whole is critical to the world's economy. A huge percentage of global lending is from euro-area banks, and they are all contracting their balance sheets. In a banking balance-sheet crisis, you reduce the debt you can, not the debt that is the most needed or reliable. And some of the debt will be to foreign entities. As an example, Austria is now requiring its banks to cover their Eastern European loans with local deposits. Which is of course problematical, as the size of those loans relative to the bank balance sheets and the Austrian economy is huge. According to BIS statistics, Austrian banks' total exposure to the region equates to around 67% of the country's GDP, not including the Vienna-based Bank Austria, which is technically Italian.

We could find similar results for other European (mostly Spanish), as well as Latin American banks. And as I note below, this will reach into China and throughout Asia.

The Risk of Contagion in the US

And the US? I am constantly asked what my biggest worry is. What is the largest monster I think I hear in my closet of nightmares? And the answer has been the same for a long time: it is European banks.

Those who think this is all a non-event note (correctly) that US net exposure to European banks is not all that large, and that while it may not be a non-event, it's not system-threatening. The problem is that little three-letter word net.

Gross exposure is huge, and we are starting to read that regulators and other authorities are becoming concerned. As well they should. The problem is that as a bank sells risk insurance, it can buy protection from another bank in Europe to hedge it. But who is the counterparty? How solvent are they? It was only a month before Dexia collapsed that authorities and markets assured us that the bank was fine, and then bang! it was nationalized.

That is the part we do not know enough about. If European banks are as bad as they appear to be, then that counterparty risk is large. Will sovereign nations step up and bail out US banks on the credit default swaps their banks sold? Care to wager your national economy on that concept selling in today's political climate?

Contagion is the #1 risk on the minds of European leaders and regulatory authorities, and it should be in the US, too. This points to a massive failure in Dodd-Frank to regulate credit default swaps and put them on an exchange. This is the single largest error in the last few decades, as it was so predictable. At least with the repeal of Glass-Steagall it was the unintended consequences that got us. Dodd- Frank almost guarantees another credit and banking crisis. Don't get me started.

Since the ECB is for now off the table as a source of unlimited funds (remember I said "for now"), there are calls for funds from a variety of sources. Some new supranational fund, more EFSF "donations," etc. The only semi-realistic one is IMF participation. If that is seriously considered, then the US Congress should step in and protest. US funds should not be used for governments of the size of Italy and Spain. These are not third-world countries. This is a European issue of their own making and not the responsibility of US taxpayers, or for that matter taxpayers anywhere else. We should "just say no."

As I have been writing, there is no credible source other than the ECB for the amount of funds needed. Maybe something can be cobbled together under the pressure of a crisis, but for now there is no realistic option. Europe is at the end of the road unless Germany "blinks." The only thing we can do now is to see how it works out.

If the ECB can't print, then the rules have to be changed, if the eurozone is to survive. And while a recession is underway.

"Maersk Line, the world's largest container shipper by volume, plans to cut its capacity on Asia-to-Europe routes, a senior executive said Friday, as the euro-zone debt crisis weighs on international trade.

"Almost all carriers are losing money now ... and it looks like 2012 will going to be similarly challenging," Tim Smith, the company's North Asia chief, told reporters at a shipping conference."

Time is not on the Europeans' side. Let's hope they can figure it out, but prepare for what might happen if they don't.

Time to Start Watching China

I am going to begin devoting more time to analysis of Asia in general and China in particular. There are signs of problems developing, and they demand study. Here is just one note (of a dozen) that came across my desk in the last two days. This is from Andy Lees of UBS:

"We saw today that 80% of Chinese construction firms say developers are now behind on payments (late cash flow), and that consequently land purchases are already 42% down y/y (slowing local authority cash flow). We also heard that pricing controls means that utility companies no longer have the cash flow to afford vital imports. Q3 corporate cash flow was down 27%.

"China's trade surplus is annualizing this year at USD152bn, FDI [Foreign Direct Investing] @ USD114bn yet its FX reserve increase is USD472bn. The attached chart [below] shows Chinese external borrowings which unfortunately were last updated at the end of last year, but the data would infer these have continued to soar.

"I am being told that European banks are now starting to shrink their foreign loan books to meet domestic needs, with Mexico, Brazil and China all big losers. With China now saying they may run a full-year trade deficit next year, and with them unable to afford to import vital coal and other resources without either suffering domestic inflation or without selling its FX reserves, it may now well be time to consider some sort of puts on the yuan. In fact the only reason perhaps not to is that India may collapse first, reducing the competition for coal and giving China a little more breathing room.

China is not a problem in the short term. But there have to be adjustments to keep that status of "not a problem." The situation bears watching and becoming familiar with, as I am on the record that Japan is the next in line to suffer a real world-shaking crisis. And China, which does not adjust in advance, can suffer contagion effects from Japan. The world is so connected.

My plan now, in addition to reading more is to tap some very good sources who either live in or travel to China a lot. And I will visit China for at least two weeks next summer, depending on publishing schedules. Europe is getting so old hat, and the crisis there will resolve, one way or another. Let's focus on a different set of opportunities.

New York, China, and Some Links

Last week I had the privilege of meeting Ken Rogoff at the UBS Wealth Management Conference. He graciously allowed me to take a picture with him. I got to listen to a panel with him; Ottmar Issing, noted German former central banker); and Jim O'Neil, Chairman, Goldman Sachs Asset Management; along with Alan Greenspan. Your basic $400,000 panel, assuming O'Neil was free. Only Greenspan spoke separately (and gave a very short speech). I could have listened to all of them a lot longer.

There was remarkable convergence with the panel I was on, except that I am under no pressure to be politically correct, or simply do not recognize that I should be. Everyone was concerned about Europe. I was not seen as alarmist by any fair comparison.

It was also good to have lunch with Art Cashin and finally hear him speak. He got two standing ovations, both of which he deserved. Not many know his pivotal role at the NYSE or have his level of experience and trust. He is a true legend. And if luck and schedule hold, I get to be with him for dinner Monday night, along with Barry Ritholtz, Barry Habib, Michael Lewitt, Rich Yamarone (of Bloomberg), and maybe Dennis Gartman, as well as Tiffani. What a treat.

Then it's back home the next morning to be here until January 10, when I fly to Hong Kong and Singapore.

Let me commend to you an interview the BBC did with my friend Kyle Bass of Hayman Advisors, which is the opening story in the current best-selling book by Michael Lewis, Boomerang! You can listen to it at http://www.zerohedge.com/news/kyle-bass-un-edited-buying-gold-just-buying-put-against-idiocy-political-cycle-its-simple. It is 24 minutes, and the video does not seem exactly synced, so just listen to someone who is always thinking about what lies ahead and has done a good job of it so far. And think with him. And kudos to Kyle for handling a very hostile interview so well. He has more patience than I do.

I was at the Cleveland Clinic on Monday and saw eight doctors for a general check-up and some real focus on my arm. Turns out to be a torn rotator cuff and also tennis elbow. They are not related, and no surgery needed, but there is rehab.

And then I heard from Richard Russell. Let me belatedly wish Richard an even faster recovery than I enjoy. He broke his hip and is graciously sharing his rehab with readers, as he has shared his life over the years. He wrote yesterday, "I heard rehab for a broken hip was hard. That's a false statement. It's harder than hard. You have to build the strength in your good leg and both of your arms, to a point beyond your wildest fantasies. In other words, three of your limbs have to make up for the loss in strength in the leg that you can't use."

Makes me think "What arm pain?" I am embarrassed to even mention it. Richard, as in everything, continues to be my hero.

It is time to hit the send button. I fly to NYC Sunday morning to meet with Bill Dunkelberg, and we will spend a long afternoon detailing our book on jobs and employment. Then Tiffani comes in for dinner and we have meetings all day Monday for our business. So much is happening. Have a great week and enjoy the season. Figure out how to spend more time with family and friends. I know I need to.

Your just stopping here before it becomes another book analyst,

John Mauldin
John@FrontlineThoughts.com

Copyright 2011 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved.

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

mald

Simon Hunt November/December Economic Report
John Mauldin | November 21, 2011

I have been reading and talking with Simon Hunt for a long time. He is a very thoughtful Brit who spends a lot of time in China and thinks about copper and commodities and cycles. He has enough seasoning to have seen a few cycles himself. This piece summarizes rather well the view that he has expressed for some time. And while I am generally skeptical of relying too much on cycles for specifics (they work until they don't), I think Simon has some very powerful conclusions. From his summary:

"The world is in a balance sheet depression which will make a second and perhaps more dangerous credit crisis almost inevitable. That should break out next year or in 2013.

"The three global pillars of the world economy, the USA, Europe and China, each have their own problems, but their impact is global because of the feedback loops from the financial sector to the economy.

"The USA has a debt and deficit profile which is unsustainable; the Euro Zone has to decide whether it can forge a fully fiscal union or whether the costs are too great, in which event membership will be restructured; and China is trying to put its economy on a more sustainable growth path at a time of leadership change.

"Debt and demographics will be the determining forces to global growth. Markets will no longer countenance indecision and pushing debt problems under the table by lending more funds to indebted governments. Politicians want to postpone what they know is inevitable: debts must be repaid."

This is a very interesting Outside the Box and one I suggest you put some thought into, as to how its conclusions may affect you.

I write this from Dr. Mike Roizen's office in Cleveland, where I will be at the Wellness Clinic tomorrow to do a general physical and to find out specifically what is wrong with my right arm. Nothing life-threatening here, as I told my daughters last night. Just life-annoying.

I get back to Dallas in time to go shopping for Thanksgiving dinner and start the cooking. Some things just have to be done overnight. I love this week! 40-plus people coming to dinner. And I hope you have a great holiday as well. And if you are not in the US and don't celebrate Thanksgiving, then make up an excuse and get your family and friends together and have a great meal, emphasis on together. We should do things like this more often!

Your enjoying life more and more (even with the damn arm) analyst,

John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
JohnMauldin@2000wave.com

Simon Hunt Strategic Services

Simon Hunt November/December Economic Report

"Four years into the crisis it is surely time to accept that the underlying problem is one of solvency not liquidity – solvency of banks and solvency of countries. Of course, the provision of additional liquidity support to countries and institutions in trouble can buy valuable time. But that time will prove valuable only if it is used to tackle the underlying problem.......But the underlying problems of excessive debt have not gone away. As a result, markets are now posing new questions about the solvency of banks and indeed governments themselves." Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, 18th October 2011.

1. Summary

• The world is in a balance sheet depression which will make a second and perhaps more dangerous credit crisis almost inevitable. That should break out next year or in 2013.
• The three global pillars of the world economy, the USA, Europe and China each have their own problems, but their impact is global because of the feedback loops from the financial sector to the economy.
• The USA has a debt and deficit profile which is unsustainable; the Euro Zone has to decide whether it can forge a fully fiscal union or whether the costs are too great in which event membership will be restructured; and China is trying to put its economy on a more sustainable growth path at a time of leadership change.
• Debt and demographics will be the determining forces to global growth.
Markets will no longer countenance indecision and pushing debt problems under the table by lending more funds to indebted governments. Politicians want to postpone what they know is inevitable: debts must be repaid.
• European banks are under duress; government debt represents a large proportion of their asset base. They are also the largest lender to all the major regions of the world. To shore up their own balance sheets they will be cutting credits etc.
• The world will suffer from rolling recessions starting either next year or in 2013 lasting to about 2018. Global industrial production should fall by an average of 0.25% a year during this period.
• By then the process of deleveraging should have run its course. The world beyond 2018 will be a different place. World industrial production should average around 3% a year to 2030 compared with an average of 3.3% in the period 1990-2010. Monetary policy will also be quite different; global money supply will match global GDP, not the massive increase experienced since 2008.
• Asset inflation will be virtually non-existent as funds will experience solid long term growth in equities. CPI inflation will be contained at around 3% a year as a world average. This will be a golden period after the turmoil of the 2000 to 2018 years.

2. Introduction

Truth can be ugly and solutions often painful. The world is at the start of a balance sheet depression as Professor Rogoff stated in a German interview. But, policy makers will not own up to this simple description of the world economy, preferring to put band aids on gaping wounds. The truth, though both ugly and painful, is that the world is heading towards its second and, arguably, more serious global credit crisis within five years of the first.

Each of the three principal pillars of the world economy, the USA, Europe and China, has their own problems, but they boil down to two simple ingredients: debt and demographics. They may be special to their own countries/region but the impact is global because of the feedback loops from the financial sector, which is global in structure, into the world economy.

Few, if any, country will be spared from the rolling recessions and deflation which have started, will intensify and probably not end until around 2018. One example of this interrelationship is that European banks are and, have been, the principal providers of international lending. They account for more than 50% of international bank lending in all the major regions of the world, excepting Asia where it is just under 45%. These banks are under duress; they are probably already scaling back their international lending even to Asia. If this trend were to become significant, the contagion impact would be substantial.

This point was made by Mark Carney, the Bank of Canada governor and the first chairman of the Financial Stability Board. Market volatility is increasing and activity declining as global liquidity shrinks. He added, "The effect on the real economy will soon be felt." To meet tier 1 capital ratios by next June, European banks have to raise US$2.4 trillion with a good part being raised by asset sales. And this, of course, takes neither account of impaired sovereign, corporate or household loans nor the latest EMU guidelines "which ask banks to mark down distressed assets to better ascertain capital raising requirements", as GaveKal wrote yesterday.

The interdependency of governments and their banks is well and shrewdly described by Jim Millstein in today's FT.

"The financial fate of Europe's banks and its governments are inextricably linked: because the banks are the primary source of funding for government deficits, government debt represents a large proportion of the asset base of most eurozone banks. Insolvency of one therefore threatens the insolvency of the other...The truth, however, is that given the level of eurozone government indebtedness and the relative size of Europe's banks, Europe's largest banks are too big to save."

Such is the seriousness of the problems facing so many countries in Europe; their fate will have global repercussions. It is why a new, or, some would argue ongoing, global credit crisis is virtually inevitable.

Asia, so long thought of as the epicentre of global growth, will not be immune to the issues faced in the three pillars because exports to two of them will fall substantially and are likely to slow to the third, namely China. And, as the Euro Zone (EZ) becomes a more stressful region next year, European banks may well be forced to cut credit lines to corporates and governments in Asia even more.

3. Current Situation

As the global balance sheet depression takes hold, the world is moving from one crisis to another. It was only a few months ago that the market's focus was on the USA; then it was China and now it is the EZ.

Today's EZ's problems were caused by trying to cement together a ragbag of countries into the European Monetary Union which included Germany on the strong side and Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy on the weak side. The monetary assumption that was appropriate for Germany would be appropriate for all of the other members.

Herein lay the fault lines. The weak members were able to get a German credit rating which meant that they could borrow to consume goods and finance industry and infrastructure that otherwise would not have been possible. Banks, too, were happy to lend to the governments of these countries because they could take the loans to the ECB and use them as collateral for even more borrowing. A credit frenzy followed which has resulted in today's debt crisis.

Chart 1: Household, Corporate & Government Debt as % of Nominal GDP

Source: Bank for International Settlements

Now many of these countries are in a critical condition. This table produced by the BIS in their September report breaks down a country's total debt by household, corporate and government for some European countries plus the USA and Japan. There are three countries whose debt is above the BIS threshold level for all three categories – the UK, Canada and Portugal – and ten whose debt is above the threshold level for two of them.

Once again markets tend to focus on one culprit at a time starting with Greece, now to Italy and then perhaps to France, Spain and Belgium. The reality is that markets are going to have to focus on all of the weak countries because the numbers are just too large.

Chart 2: E1,500bn to be financed in peripheral euro area states between now and 2014

Source: Pictet, Decision Time for Monetary Union, November 2011

Sovereign refinancing by 2014 will be huge and this ignores the sums required to recapitalise the banks: in total we are talking of between E3trillion and E4trillion. As a percent of GDP, the refinancings are alarming for four of these five countries – Greece 30%, Italy 26%, Portugal 19% and Spain 16% for next year.

That is not the end of the story. Analysts conveniently forget the future liabilities such as pension funds. If these are added to the debt set out in the previous chart total government liabilities as a percent of GDP become quite extraordinary. As of last year they were:

Chart 3

Thanks to Niels Jensen of Absolute Return Partners in their November 2011 letter, our attention was drawn to the work of Egan-Jones, a credit rating company whose revenues originate from institutions and who have a powerful track record. They state that Greece cannot reasonably support more than E40bn in taxes, equivalent to only 10% of the amount outstanding. "That's why debt holders are likely to face a 90% haircut.....And unless trends reverse, Spain, Italy and Belgium will follow."

This brings us to an awful truth: will Germany allow the ECB and/or the EFSF to effectively print money to enable the weak members to repay their debts. The problem is that the Bundesbank and Germany's Constitutional Court will not allow Germany to participate in such a program for their own historic reasons and because, quite sensibly, printing money does not work. Future stability, together with fiscal and structural reforms, would disappear risking a substantial rise in the cost of living (CPI inflation) as well as asset inflation.

The choice before Germany is then simple but harsh. Either to throw caution to the winds and hope that by printing money the Euro Zone can be saved and stability created or to accept the painful truth that "the Euro is an incoherent nonsense which, in its current form, is doing far more harm than good", as Liam Halligan wrote on Sunday.

There are sign that German and other officials are quietly preparing for the possible departure of weak countries from the EZ. The heads of Germany and France have publically acknowledged that euro membership is not permanent. This could mean either that the weaker members leave or that the stronger leave and reconstitute the Euro around a smaller number of countries. Either way the cost would be considerable but arguably less than attempting to force the high spending countries into a German fiscal and monetary structure.

The prospect of a temporary return to sanity in Italian and Greek politics with the swearing in of Mario Monti as Italy's new Prime Minister and the appointment of lucas Papademus in Greece raises market expectations that both countries will begin the process of making their economies more competitive and in a position to repay debt etc. Both are well respected technocrats but both are unelected officials. Both countries will introduce some of the right measures but the question of implementation remains. For Greece, the arrival of the troika to help run the economy is likely to provoke anger in the country; and for Italy, whilst Berlusconi has lost office, his influence will still be felt in parliament via his party members who had supported him.

Implementation of the technocrats' policies will be the real problem. This is possibly the EU's last throw of the dice. If their policies are not fully implemented a change in the membership structure of the EZ will be unavoidable.

In summary, our best guess is that there will be a temporary honeymoon as markets react positively to the appointment of the two technocrats. Other problems will surface in some of the other weaker members of the EZ. Eventually, there will be a restructuring of the EZ centred on Germany, the northern members and France though the latter country might find the disciplined approach to fiscal and monetary policies of Germany too difficult for them to swallow.

Chart 4: Markit Eurozone PMI & GDP

Source: Markit, Eurostaat, GDP = gross domestic product

Meanwhile, business is falling sharply in Europe as has been clearly shown by the various PMIs and the IFO data. The latest OECD Composite Leading Indicators also show that business activity is falling in Europe. However, it is not only in Europe that business is weakening.

Chart 5: NBS China PMIs

Source: NBS

China's official GDP for the fourth quarter is likely to fall to around 8.5% in the fourth quarter and to remain at around that level in 2012. Its electricity production fell sharply in October (- 5.8%) versus September and by a massive 15% compared with August. Railway freight is growing by only 3.5% year-on-year and fell marginally month-on-month in October.

China is not immune to the twin global constraints of debt and demographics. We will expand on the latter later, but McKinsey estimated that China's total debt to GDP ratio was 159% at the end of 2008. It must now be considerably higher. A recent report, for instance, estimates that local government debt is as much as $473 billion or RMB 3 trillion when township government debt is included which was not the case under the nation's audit office.

Imbedded inflation is a growing problem due to rising cost inputs for foods, grains and soya for pigs and fertilizers for corn etc. Per capita meat consumption is rising; wages are increasing at a rate faster than productivity and soon the costs of water and electricity will have to be increased even faster.

Managing the transition from an export model to a domestically driven consumption one is proving difficult and will become even more so should the world economy slump into recession, a likely scenario. And managing the leadership transition is more fraught than usual. We suspect that once the new leadership takes full control in 2013 there will be a period of „clamp down' as government digests the hangovers from years of growth beyond sustainable rates.

Chart 6: IFO North American Economic Climate

Most forward-looking indicators are suggesting either that the US economy will slip into recession if not next year then in 2013. The just released OECD Composite Leading Indicators also signal a slowing economy. Rail freight data for October was up by only 1.7% on 2010 despite the fact that October is almost always the top month for intermodal traffic as it is the month when retailers do the bulk of their stocking for the holidays.

Debt, of course, is on an unsustainable path. Politicians seem incapable of devising a credible long-term deficit reduction program. Some foreign holders of Treasury paper are becoming frustrated by the antics of Washington. At some point over the coming six months a shock will be imposed which will bring down the US dollar; the index (DXY) could then fall below the 70 level so resulting in a full blown run on the currency. Markets will be sufficiently frozen that the politicians will be forced to devise a sensible long-term plan to reduce the deficit; the run on the US$ should also force the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. The US dollar will then recover very sharply into 2013 at least, though we suspect that its recovery will be longer lasting.

In summary, current indicators suggest that at the very best global growth will be slow next year. There is a risk that the Federal Reserve will have another drive to pour liquidity into the system to be followed by the ECB having to act as lender of last resort. If this does occur asset prices will rise, but the impact of such monetary ease on the real economy will be anaemic. It is likely to be followed by a crash in 2013. We rate this scenario as a 40% chance.

The more likely outcome is that the ECB continues to operate under the Bundesbank mantra providing token relief to the weak members. Europe will remain in recession. The US economy, despite any action by the Federal Reserve (pushing on a string) will have very slow growth at best but will return to recession in 2013. Asia will be affected by banks in Europe having to raise capital together with much reduced exports outside the region. And in China growth will be slower so experiencing a reduction in exports. World industrial production will be very weak with a recession in 2013. We rate this outcome as a 60% chance.

4. The 2013 & Beyond

The period starting in 2013 – and it could be in 2012 – will be fraught as the world deleverages after a generation of governments promising more than they can pay for and in many countries households borrowing more than they can afford. This is a bad enough environment but it is made worse by society aging in so many countries: there will be far fewer workers to support retirees.

Professors Reinhardt and Rogoff have well documented what happens to economic activity in their book, "This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly." "The aftermath of systemic banking crises involves a protracted contraction in economic activity and puts significant strains on government resources." More recently they add that you can't get rid of debt quickly and you can't get rid of it nicely. The bullet has to be bitten meaning that debt must be repaid rather than one institution lending to another so that the latter can repay its debt.

Anyone who had listened to what the Bank for International Settlements was saying since 2005 would have been well prepared for the shocks that began towards the end of 2007 and then blew up in 2008. They are now issuing a new warning in their September 2011 report, The Real Effects of Debt. We should heed this warning. They conclude,

"Our examination of debt and economic activity in industrial countries leads us to conclude that there is a clear linkage: high debt is bad for growth. When public debt is in a range of 85% of GDP, further increases in debt may begin to have a significant impact on growth (in 1st qtr 2010 USA's debt: GDP ratio was 117%)....A clear implication of these results is that debt problems facing advanced economies are even worse than we thought. Given the benefits that governments have promised to their populations, ageing will sharply raise public debt to much higher levels in the next few decades. At the same time, ageing may reduce future growth and may raise interest rates, further undermining debt sustainability. So, as public debt rises and populations age, growth will fall. As growth falls, debt rises even more, reinforcing the downward impact on an already low growth rate."

They conclude, "In the end, the only way out is to increase saving." This is part of the process of deleveraging which is likely to take until around 2018 to run its course. These years will be characterised by rolling recessions and deflating asset prices interspaced by short periods of recovery.

The second dynamic which will help shape the world economy will be the demographic changes with so many countries' population age profiles changing for the worse and far outnumbering those that will continue to have positive demographic profiles, India, Indonesia and Brazil to name just three.

Chart 7: A Snapshot of Global Demographic Trends

Source: CIA, Long Term Global Demographics Trends: Reshaping the Geographical Landscape

Demographic change is not an abstract development; it will have serious consequences for future growth. The OECD, for instance, estimates that the impact of aging on GDP growth rates will be a decrease of growth in Europe to 0.5% a year, in Japan to 0.6% a year and in the USA to 1.5% a year in the period 2025-2050.

Chart 8: Aging Will Cause a Global Wealth Shortfall

Source: McKinsey & Company

Demographic changes will impact household wealth creation. In their report, The Coming Demographic Deficit: How Aging Populations will Reduce Global Savings, they wrote: "Aging will cause growth in household financial wealth to slow by more than two-thirds across countries we studied (USA, Japan, and W Europe), from 4.5% historically to 1.2% going forward. The slowing growth will cause the level of household financial wealth in 2024 to fall some 36% or by $31 trillion, below what it would have been had the higher historical growth rates persisted."

For Europe, the demographic profile is worrisome. According to data by Dr Clint Laurent and his team at Global Demographics, the number of 65+ aged group rises from around 19.6% of the population in 2011 to 29.1% in 2031 with the dependency ratio standing at just 2% by then.

Chart 9: Demographics of China & the USA

Source: Dr Clint Laurent, Global Demographics

A surprising development is that the demographic profile of the USA is so much better than that of China. Once the USA puts its financial house in better order, which it will if not willingly, its growth expectations will be better than China's. As we say in Yorkshire, "Think on".

For China, based on simple fundamentals, growth has peaked. The years of circa 10% growth are over because such growth is unsustainable and brings in its wake a package of problems. "One approach to forecasting total real GDP of a country is to combine the projected trend in the number of persons employed with the projected trend in the gross productivity per worker" writes Dr Laurent. He calculates that the trends in the education index of the country should give an expected productivity growth of 7.8% a year to 2016 and 5.8% a year to 2021. This equation gives a trend growth rate for real GDP growth of

• 7.5% a year to 2016
• 5.1% a year to 20121, and
• 3% a year to 2031

This slowdown will have a huge impact on China's future requirements of imported metals like copper. This trend is likely to be magnified also by US and other foreign companies vacating China and returning to their home bases – in the USA once the political system rolls back much of the red tape, health care costs and tax issues etc. There is a fundamental reason for companies to return home: it is that multinationals want their supplier chains adjacent to the market, not on the other side of the world.

Thus, demographics and debt will be huge constraints on world growth. In the 2020-30 period it will partially be made good by technology so enhancing productivity per worker. The chart below sets out our forecasts of world industrial production to 2035 with average annual growth rates shown for each decade.

Chart 10: World Industrial Production - % Growth Per Annum

Copyright 2011 John Mauldin. All Rights Reserved.