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Nouriel Roubini's Global EconoMonitor

The delusional complacency that the "worst is behind us" is rapidly melting away…and the risk of another run against systemically important broker dealers  Nouriel Roubini | Jun 27, 2008 After the collapse in mid-March of Bear Stearns and the ensuing bailout of Bear's creditors and the extension of the Fed's lender of last resort support to systemically important members of the "shadow banking system" (the non-bank broker dealers that are primary dealers) a sense of delusional complacency emerged in financial markets based on fairy tales such as "the worst is behind us", the "recession will be short and shallow", that "housing is bottoming out" or even that "we will avoid the recession". This chorus of cheerleaders included policy makers that had missed the incoming financial tsunami for most of 2007, CEOs and senior financial sector folks who had lost hundreds of billions of dollars with their reckless lending, and investments and a bunch of self serving spin-masters talking non-stop their long books on CNBC and other financial media. This circus of "the worst is behind us" became a pathetic and louder chorus in the two months from mid-March till the end of May. This delusion was for a short couple of months supported by rising stock prices, reduction in credit spreads and interbank spread that, however, remained very high and indicated a persistent liquidity and credit crunch. But this delusional complacency is now rapidly collapsing as financial markets are back to panic mode. Let's detail how… Those of us who had predicted this economics and financial mess (the worst housing bust since the Great Depression, the subprime and mortgage meltdown, the bust of the credit bubble, a nasty liquidity and credit crunch, high and rising oil prices, an ugly recession) well before (in the summer of 2006) 99% of the world had even heard the term "subprime" held to our sound and analytically grounded views that: this would be the housing was not bottoming out, that this would be the worst housing recession since the Great Depression and that home prices would eventually fall 30% plus, that millions of underwater households are at risk of walking away from their homes ("jingle mail"), that the we were in the eye of the financial storm (rather than past it) and this would be the worst U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression, that credit losses would mount over time well above $1 trillion, that we would have a systemic banking and financial crisis with hundred of institutions going belly up, that the stock market would fall back into serious bear territory after another and last sucker's rally, that the recession would be deep and protracted (12 to 18 months and U-shaped rather than V-shaped), that the Fed would stay on hold (or even cut rates further by year end) as the economic and financial crisis becomes more severe, that the world would not decouple – financially and/or economically – from the U.S. contraction, that the exchange rate policies of the BW2 countries (partially sterilized intervention creating easy monetary conditions and excessive credit growth) would lead first to asset bubbles and then to rising inflation as the needed real exchange rate appreciation would occur through a rise in prices if the nominal appreciation would be prevented, that BW2 would come under severe strain once this asset bubble would go bust and inflation rose. Now the delusional complacency in markets is melting away or, better, going bust. With the 3% plus fall in US equity prices on Thursday stock prices are well below their bottoms of mid-march at the peak of the financial panic and back to level not seen since the fall of 2006. Also, credit spreads and interbank spreads are rising again towards their peak levels. Thus, the liquidity and credit crunch is significantly worsening. As argued in this forum the economic contraction would lead to a sharp rise in credit losses well beyond subprime: from subprime to near prime and prime, to commercial real estate, to credit cards, student loans and auto loans, to leveraged loans that financed reckless LBOs, to muni bonds, to further losses from the downgrade of monoline insurers, to industrial and commercial loans, to corporate bonds, to CDS losses. In February this forum argued that credit losses would be at least $1 trillion. At that time that figure was derided as excessive but by now the IMF says losses will be $945 billion, Goldman Sachs estimates them at $1.1 trillion, George Magnus of UBS estimates them at $1 trillion and the hedge fund manager John Paulson (who made a fortune last year betting against subprime) is estimating them at $1.3 trilliion. Thus, it is now clear that $1 trillion is not a ceiling but rather a floor estimate for what those financial losses will be. The deleveraging process for the financial system has barely started as most of the writedowns have been for subprime mortgages; the writedowns and/or provisioning for the additional losses have barely started. Thus, hundreds of banks in the U.S. are at risk of collapse. The typical small U.S. Bank (with assets less of $4 billion has 67% of its assets related to real estate; for large banks the figure is 48%. Thus, hundreds of small banks will go belly up as the typical local bank financed the housing, the commercial real estate, the retail boom, the office building of communities where housing is now going bust. Even large regional banks massively exposed to real estate in California, Arizona, Nevada, Florida and other states with a housing boom and now bust will go belly up. And even large banks and broker dealers are now at risk. After the bailout of Bear Stearns' creditor and the extension of lender of last resort liquidity support the tail risk of an immediate financial meltdown was reduced as that liquidity support stopped the run on the shadow banking system. Indeed in March we were an epsilon away from such meltdown as – without the Fed actions – you would have had a run not only on Bear but also on Lehman, JP Morgan, Merrill and most of the shadow banking system. This system of non-banks looked in most ways like banks (borrow short/liquid, leverage a lot and lend longer term and illiquid). So the risk of a bank-like run on non-bank (whose base of uninsured wholesale short term creditors/lenders is much more fickle and run trigger-happy – as the Bear episode showed - than the stable base of insured depositors of banks) became massive. Thus, the Fed made its most radical change of monetary policy since the Great Depression extending both lender of last resort support to non-bank systemically important broker dealers (via the PDCF) and becoming a market maker of last resort to banks and non-banks (via the TAF and the TSLF) to avoid a full scale sudden run on the shadow banking system and a sure meltdown of the financial system. While the tail risk of such a meltdown has now been reduced the view that systemically important broker dealers - that have now access to the TSLF and the PDCF – now don't risk a panic-triggered run on their liabilities is false; several of them can still collapse and not be rescued. The reasons are as follows: liquidity support by the Fed is warranted for illiquid but solvent institutions but not for insolvent ones; and the risks that some of the major broker dealers may face is not just of illiquidity but also insolvency (Lehman had as much exposure to toxic MBS, CDOs and other risky assets as Bear did). The Fed already tested the limits of legality (as argued by Volcker) in its bailout of Bear's creditors. Suppose that a run – triggered by concerns about illiquidity and solvency – occurs against a major broker dealer (say Lehman) would the Fed come to the rescue again? The answer is not sure: such broker dealer has access to the PDCF but sharply borrowing from this facility would signal that the institution may be bleeding liquidity and be in trouble; thus large access to the Fed facility may cause the run on the liabilities of such financial institutions to accelerate rather than ebb. The reason is as follows: if creditors of the broker dealers knew with certainty that the Fed liquidity tab is open and unlimited the existence of the facility would stop the run. But if there is any meaningful probability that the amount that the Fed would be willing to lend to an institutions using that facility is not unlimited and is not unconditional then use of the facility may accelerate the run – as those first in line would have access to the liquidity provided by the Fed lending to the broker dealer in trouble while those waiting may be stuck once the lending stops. This is akin to a currency crisis in a pegged exchange rate regime triggered by a run on the forex reserves of a central bank. Once the reserves are running down and investors expect that the central bank will run out of reserves the run accelerated and the collapse of the peg occurs faster. So why the Fed would not provide unconditional and unlimited liquidity to a broker dealer in trouble and thus allow the run to occur? Several reasons: the Bear Stearns actions were borderline illegal; the Fed cannot keep on bailing out any major broker dealer in trouble; the Fed may be running out of Treasuries to swap for illiquid/toxic securities; the Fed is starting to face credit risks from swapping and holding toxic assets (the $29 billion given to Bear, the hundreds of billions swapped via the TAF and TSLF); the authorization for the PDCF expires in the fall; the Fed should not bail out – with risks to its own balance sheet institutions that may be insolvent on top of being illiquid. Thus, the delusion that TSLF and PDCF implies that the risk of a run against systemically important broker dealers is now close to zero is just a delusion. If a run against Lehman or another broker dealer starts again and this broker dealer borrows $5 billion from the Fed and then $10 billion investors and creditors of this institutions – who need to decide whether to pull out or keep their credit lines – will ask themselves whether the Fed would allow this broker dealer to borrow $10 and then $15 and then $20 and then $25 and then $30 billion and then even more. Unless the Fed credibly commits to unconditional and unlimited lending the use of the facility by a broker dealer in trouble may accelerate rather than stop the run on its short term liabilities. Thus, the argument that - in a world where the Fed has extended its lender of last resort support to non-bank financial institutions – the risk of a run against these institutions is now close to zero is flawed. Certainly the rising financial tsunami ahead as the economic contraction gets worse, the financial/credit losses mount, the credit and liquidity crunch gets worse will test both the ability and the political willingness of the Fed to further bail out major financial institutions that are in serious trouble. So the worst is well ahead of us – not behind us – for the real economy and financial markets.